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I. INTRODUCTION

Empathy involves both cognition and emotion.1 On a cognitive
level, empathy requires taking another's perspective and
understanding that person's feelings.2 Sometimes empathy also
includes sharing another's emotions. We understand some
experiences and readily share some emotional reactions, and fail to
understand or share others.' Judges, lawyers, jurors, and other
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I thank Jean Bax, Avani
Kamdar, and Judy Lukosen for research assistance. I thank Michelle Oberman and Andrea
Lyon for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft. I thank the Dean of the DePaul
College of Law, Teree Foster, for generous summer support.
1. See, e.g., Tamara M. Haegerich & Bette L. Bottoms, Empathy and Jurors'Decisions
in PatricideTrials Involving Child Sexual Assault Allegations, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 421,
422(2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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members ofthejudicial system, being human, will inevitably be able
to empathize with some parties and witnesses more than others.
Empathy is the result of complex cognitive processes and
therefore subject to a number of biases associated with the ways in
which we process information and emotions. We often tend to
empathize with those who have power, rather than those without
power. We tend to see members of "other" groups as more uniform
and more different from ourselves than they are. We tend to see
some emotions as inevitable or incredible for some people in some
situations.
Empathy plays crucial roles in both shaping law and affecting
outcomes in litigation. The legal system is a system of rules and
procedures participants use when seeking legal affirmation of their
viewpoints. The ability or inability to empathize with someone is
often the basis for either recognition or denial of a tort action to
redress an injury or of a defense in such an action. Similar points
could be made about all areas of law and hold whether the law is
made by judges or by legislators. An obvious example is the
availability of the heat-of-passion defense to reduce murder to
manslaughter in situations in which lawmakers can empathize with
the defendant.
This symposium celebrates the recent publication of a collection
of essays on the roles emotions play in law: The Passionsof Law,
edited by Susan Bandes.4 Several essays note problems of the type
I discuss here. In her introduction, Susan Bandes argues that
judges inevitably make decisions on the basis of selective empathy
and their own values.' And in her contribution, Cheshire Calhoun
explores the notion of outlaw emotions, emotions that are regarded
as inappropriate or impossible for some people in certain situations.6
Calhoun considers the inability of many to see romantic love in
same-sex relationships as an illustration ofthis phenomenon as well
as an explanation of why most Americans cannot imagine same-sex
marriage.7
None of the essays in Bandes' collection discuss the difficulties
faced by battered women in the courtroom, many of which are
related to problems almost all of us face in understanding battered
4. THE PASSIONS OF LAw (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
5. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 6 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999).
6. Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE
PASSIONS OF LAW, 217, 223-25 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
7. Id. at 234. Judges share the common perception that marriage is impossible for two
women or two men. See Mary Becker, Family Law in the SecularState and Restrictions on
Same-Sex Marriage:Two are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2-8.
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women. Judge Posner does, however, make two points that suggest
judges are likely to have difficulty understanding battered women
and their emotions.
In this article, I first discuss problems associated with selective
empathy, particularly the problems it poses for battered women. In
the second section, I discuss problems with Posner's contribution to
The Passionsof Law, given the experiences of battered women. In
the third section, I describe some of the ways in which cognitive
biases interfere with our ability to perceive others' emotions
accurately. I argue because of various cognitive problems leading
to bias in judgments of battered women, judges and juries consciously need to foster empathy for women in abusive situations. In
the fourth section, I discuss the diversity ofbattered women and two
quite ordinary passions of battered women - anger and jealousy,
passions which any reasonable person in such a situation would
likely feel but which are not permitted to "real" battered women.
In the fifth section, I use actual cases, particularly that of
Sylvia Flynn, to illustrate problems battered women who have killed
face as a result of these biases. In the sixth section, I explain why
Sylvia's actions make sense as those of a battered woman, despite
her failure to conform to every stereotype ofbattered women. In the
seventh section, I explore in depth the problems faced by Sylvia at
the trial level and suggest changes that might decrease the bias
battered women face in the legal system. Finally, in section eight,
I provide a short summary of these reforms.
II. POSNER AND PASSION

In his contribution to Bandes' The Passions of Law, Judge
Posner discusses emotions in the context of violence against victims
who are almost always women (and often battered women)
victimized by men,8 and in doing so, demonstrates a profound
failure to empathize with women who are the victims of male
violence. Posner begins this section of his essay by noting that law
is not pro or con emotions: "The significance of the emotional
component of behavior regulated by law is bound to depend.., on
8. Victoria Nourse, Passion'sProgress:Modern Law Reform and the ProvocationDefense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1335 (1997).

In the cases I have studied, men are by far the most frequent victimizers, and
women the most frequent victims. But that does not mean that only women are
killed; indeed, it is often the man helping the woman leave - the sheriff or the
mover or the lover - who dies.
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the purpose of the particular law."9 Posner uses criminal law to
illustrate his point and sees the purpose of criminal law as limiting
dangerous activity. 10 He then explores the appropriate level of
punishment in emotional murders, for example, homicides
committed in the heat-of-passion:
It could be argued... that the more "emotional" the crime,
the more rather than the less severe the punishment should be
because a greater threat of punishment may be necessary to
deter in those circumstances. But not only do the greater ease
of catching the emotional criminal and the lesser risk that he
will repeat the crime (because it is situation-specific and the
situation is unlikely to recur) tend to offset the need to ratchet
up the punishment to assure deterrence; in addition, most
crimes of passion involve an element of provocation on the part
of the victim, and provocation may provide a reason for lighter
punishment. Although the lighter punishment increases the
likelihood of crimes against provokers by reducing the expected
punishment cost of such crimes, it reduces that likelihood by
increasing the expected cost ofprovocation (the provoker is more
likely to be attacked, since the expected punishment cost of the
attacker is less, and knowing this may be less likely to provoke).
If the latter effect predominates, a reduction in the severity of
punishment in cases of provocation will reduce the amount of
crime."
Posner assumes two things here: first, that if the victim desists
from provocation, there will be no killing and therefore, less crime,
and second, that deterrence of provocation is appropriate.
In fact, provocation often consists of a woman trying to leave a
miserable or violent relationship. In a widely read 1997 article,
Victoria Nourse reports on an empirical study of modern heat-ofpassion manslaughter cases from 1980 to 1995.12 Nourse found that
in jurisdictions limiting heat-of-passion manslaughter to specific
categories (such as the four widely accepted in the nineteenth
century: adultery, mutual combat, false arrest, or violent assault), 3
infidelity and separation were both present in the facts of a
significant number of cases; in eighteen percent of the cases in
which the defendant succeeded in obtaining jury instructions on
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Bandes, supra note 4, at 312.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Nourse, supranote 8, at 1332.
Id. at 1341.
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heat-of-passion, there was separation as well as infidelity.' In only
eleven percent of the cases was there infidelity alone.
Results in jurisdictions following the Model Penal Code (MPC),
which replaces the traditional categories with "extreme emotional
duress," 5 are even more troubling. For cases in MPC jurisdictions
in which the defendant went to the jury with an instruction on
manslaughter, twelve percent involved simple infidelity, thirtyseven percent involved departure and infidelity, and twenty-six
percent involved simple departure.' 6 Thus, "[a] significant number
of the reform cases... involve no sexual infidelity whatsoever, but
only the desire of the killer's victim to leave a miserable
relationship." In many of these cases, there was evidence that the
"provocation" actually consisted of a battered woman attempting to
divorce her abusive husband or break up with an abusive
boyfriend.'8 In other cases, the "provocation" was that a woman
wanted out of a (nonviolent) relationship she no longer considered
satisfactory. 19
In mixed jurisdictions, using a "reasonable man" standard
which, depending on the specific jurisdiction, can be more or less
like either the traditional or MPC approach or something in
between, 2° seventeen percent of cases in which the defendant
reached the jury with a manslaughter instruction involved only
departure, and no infidelity. Thirty-four percent involved both, and
only three percent involved simple infidelity.2 '
Obviously, if the potential provoker simply stays in a violent
relationship there will be continuing crimes of violence. In these
cases, Posner's analysis is misguided on its own terms. But even if
the case is more prosaic - one in which a woman merely wants to
end a non-violent relationship - it by no means follows that the
criminal law should give her an incentive to stay in the relationship.
A person should be able to end an unsatisfactory relationship
without risking her life. We should be interested in deterring
provocateurs from provoking only when the provocation is
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1349.
Id. at 1340 n.52.
Id. at 1349.
Id.
For example, see the cases described in detail in Nourse, supra note 8, at 1343. See

also cases described supra notes 6-9.
19. Nourse did not report on how many of the cases in her sample involved evidence
suggesting pre-separation violence by the defendant. See Nourse, supra note 8, at 1348
("physical violence" coding refers to defendant's claim that he was provoked by her violence).
20. Id. at 1341-42.
21. Id. at 1349.
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something we want to deter independently of the heat-of-passion
defense. Further, a man who kills a woman who simply wants to
leave an unsatisfactory relationship may well do so again in the
future if another woman tries to leave him.
Posner completely fails to consider the consequences for women
- particularly those in violent relationships - of the legal system's

acceptance of the heat-of-passion defense. This is especially
troubling given the fact that abusive men are often extremely
jealous and see infidelity where there is none. Posner's failure to
grasp the implications of his analysis for women seems associated
with his greater ability to empathize with the male defendant in
passion murders.22 Posner does not see provocateurs as women who
want to end (and should have a right to end) relationships (which
are often miserable or even violent), but as beings who should be
deterred. He does this without even pausing to consider what
actions are considered provocative, what it is that the potential
provocateurs are being deterred from, or why they might be justified
in doing what they want to do. In contrast, Posner readily
empathizes with the passion defendant, seeing him as provoked by
the victim rather than as retaliating when she attempts to break
free of a bad or abusive relationship.
Thus, Posner demonstrates a bias in favor of the (emotional)
defendant and against the absent (provocative) victim. Ironically,
his general position, stated a little later in the same essay, is that
judges should use empathy to bring to the forefront those absent
from the courtroom (the victim of the violent crime). In the passage
making this point, Posner begins by agreeing that judges inevitably
use emotions in reaching decisions, and he argues that indignation
and empathy are two emotions essential for judges.' He regards
indignation as necessary because some widely-accepted moral rules
- such as intercourse with human corpses - are grounded, not in

reason, but in indignation, an emotion.24 He sees empathy as
important, not to understanding the situation of the litigants before
a judge, but to counteract the availability heuristic. In Posner's
words, we tend "to give too much weight to vivid immediate
impressions, such as sight over narrative, and hence to pay too
much attention to the feelings, the interests and the humanity of
the parties in the courtroom and too little to absent persons likely
22. The defendant is male in the vast majority of Nourse's cases. See supra note 8.
23. Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW
308, 310-11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
24. Id. at 322.
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to be affected by the decision."2" Judicial empathy - for those not
present - is appropriate to counteract this cognitive bias.
Posner fails, however, to use judicial empathy to counteract the
bias favoring those present in his own discussion of the heat-ofpassion cases, cases in which the defendant in the courtroom is
usually a man and the (absent) victim a woman (or a man helping
her leave).2" Part of the problem is that Posner has a thin
understanding of the many cognitive biases - not just the
availability heuristic - which inevitably affect judicial reactions.
I now turn to discuss other cognitive biases that can distort
judgment in ways detrimental to battered women.
III. COGNITIVE BIASES, EMOTIONS, AND EMPATHY

Empathy, like other complex emotions, has a cognitive basis.
It requires a cognitive understanding of the situation of the other
person' as well as the ability to imagine and understand their
emotional response.' When we see "others" as different from
ourselves, we are likely to imagine that their emotional reactions
are different from what ours would be. We are likely to imagine
their emotions in terms of stereotypes we hold about such people
rather than in terms ofhow reasonable people (like ourselves) would
feel in their situation.
A. Ingroups, Outgroups,and the Power of Stereotypes
Contemporary research in social psychology explains much
discrimination, not in terms of intentional acts, but in terms of
(often unconscious) cognitive processes. People tend automatically
to categorize others as members of ingroups and outgroups and to
"feel, think, and behave toward [particular members of the category]
the same way they.., feel, think, and behave toward members of
Categories come with
that social category more generally."'
stereotypes of how we expect members to behave and feel, resulting
in biased "perceptions, interpretations, recollections, and evalua25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 323.
See Nourse, supra note 8.
Posner, supra note 23, at 329 n.21.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29

CONTEMP. Soc. 319,320 (2001) (quoting SUSAN T. FISK, MONICA LIN & STEvEN NEUBERG, THE
CONTINUUM MODEL: TEN YEARS LATER IN DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

(Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)).
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tions." ° Biases are inherent in our cognitive processing (which
requires categorization), and "occur independently of decision
makers' group interests or their conscious desire to favor or harm
others."3 ' Given the importance of cognition to empathy, we can
expect these biases to skew our empathetic reactions to others.
Laboratory experiments reveal when people are categorized into
groups on any basis, the result is biased perceptions of differences.32
These results hold even when the basis for categorization is trivial
or silly. If participants are being told they are being grouped
according to their tendency to over (or under) estimate the size of
dots, for example, they tend to "perceive members of their group as
more similar to them, and members of other groups as more
different from them, than when those same persons are simply
viewed as noncategorized individuals." 3 Further, participants
prefer (if given a choice) to receive information about their
similarity to members of their own group and about the differences
between themselves and members of the other group.3 ' Group
members are also more likely to see differences among members of
their own group than among members of the other group. Outgroup
members tend to be perceived as homogenous.'
Grouping people, things, and events into categories is a normal
and necessary cognitive process; without it the world would be a
wilderness of discrete phenomena. As sociologist Barbara Reskin
explains:
Stereotypes are unconscious habits of thought that link personal
attributes to group membership. Stereotyping is an inevitable
concomitant of categorization: As soon as an observer notices
that a "target" belongs to a stereotyped group (especially an
outgroup), characteristics that are stereotypically linked to the
group are activated in the observer's mind,
even among people
36
who consciously reject the stereotypes.
Reskin distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive
stereotypes, both of which contribute to cognitive biases. Although,
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach
to DiscriminationandEqualEmployment Opportunity,47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1191-92(1995).

33. Id. at 1191-92.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Barbara Reskin, The ProximateCauses of Employment Discrimination,29 CONTEMP.
Soc. 319, 322-23 (2001).
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as the term suggests, descriptive stereotypes merely describe
characteristics shared by members of a group, observers tend to
interpret information in a manner consistent with stereotypes and
to fail to notice inconsistent information. 7 Prescriptive stereotypes
describe "how members of a group are supposed to be, based usually
on descriptive stereotypes of how they are."38 Observers tend to
evaluate behavior of group members in terms of the standards set
by prescriptive stereotypes. 9
Thus, both descriptive and normative stereotypes bias "in
predictable ways the perception, interpretation, encoding, retention,
and recall of information about other people."' As indicated above,
stereotypes are inevitable and useful. Sometimes they are also
accurate. But when inaccurate, stereotypes are nevertheless likely
to be applied. Nor are they easily dislodged: "People unconsciously
pursue, prefer, and remember 'information' that supports their
stereotypes (including remembering events that did not occur), and
ignore, discount, and forget information that challenges them.""1
Because empathy (like other complex emotions) involves
cognition, these cognitive processes bias our ability to empathize
with others. We are likely to see members of an outgroup as
homogenous and as more different from ourselves than they really
are. We are likely to discount or ignore information inconsistent
with descriptive stereotypes, and judge members of an outgroup in
terms of prescriptive stereotypes.
Battered women are a paradigmatic outgroup. In any legal
proceeding - whether a custody dispute,42 a tort action, or a
criminal prosecution of a batterer or of a battered woman who has
killed - other participants in the action are likely to see the
battered woman as quite different from themselves and as similar
or identical to other battered women. Even battered women tend
not to identify as such.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Kriegar, supra note 32, at 1188).
41. Id.
42. For a description of problems battered women face in custody actions, see Pamela J.
Jenkins, Contested Knowledge: Battered Women as Agents and Victims, in WITNESSING FOR
SOCIOLOGY: SOCIOLOGISTS IN COuRT 93, 93-94 (Pamela J. Jenkins & Steve Kroll-Smith, eds.,
1996).
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B. The FundamentalAttribution Error
Another cognitive bias likely to cause serious problems in cases
involving battered women is the fundamental attribution error: we
tend to think that a person's behavior is reflective of her or his basic
personality rather than the result of her or his situation.' Four
reasons have been advanced for this bias:
First, perceivers may display the bias because they lack
awareness of the situational forces that influence behavior.
Second, perceivers may display the bias because they
underestimate the power of the situation to influence behavior.
Third, perceivers may display the bias because expectations
influence their perceptions of the behavior. Fourth, perceivers
may display the bias because they lack the cognitive resources
or motivation necessary to fully consider how the situation may
have influenced the actor's behavior."
The first situation arises in cases involving battered women when
decision-makers do not know the relationship was violent or do not
know the extent of the violence.45 The fourth situation occurs in
many cases involving battered women: decision-makers often lack
the cognitive ability or motivation "necessary to fully consider how
the situation may have influenced the actor's behavior."'
The second and third situations can also be present in cases
involving battered women, but require more extended discussion.
In the second scenario, observers overestimate the extent to which
character, rather than situation, explains behavior. Anyone who
has taught a class involving domestic violence has seen the power
of this bias when students insist they would never be trapped in a
violent situation. We all want to believe that it is something about
the battered woman that explains her predicament - something we
do not share - rather than see her as a reasonable human being
responding to terror.
The third reason acknowledges that decision-makers'
expectations may skew their perceptions. Stereotypes of battered
43. Douglas S. Krull et al., The Fundamental Fundamental Attribution Error:
CorrespondenceBias in Individualist and Collectivist Cultures, 25 PERs. & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BuLL. 1208, 1208 (1999).
44. Id. at 1209.
45. See, e.g., Patricia Ann S. v. James Daniel S., 190 W. Va. 6 (1993) (disallowing evidence
of violence by family law master leads to physical and psychological abuse victim's loss of
custody of two of three children to abuser).
46. Id.
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women are likely to be particularly problematic in this context. If
decision-makers believe that battered women are all alike and are
also all different from themselves, they are likely to require that any
"real" battered woman conform to their stereotypes and be wholly
passive, never angry or jealous, and entirely dependent on and
controlled by her abusive partner. Any woman who fails to conform
to these expectations is likely to be seen as having acted because of
her character, which is not that of a "real" battered woman.
C. Power, Patriarchy,and CulturalScripts
In a hierarchical society, the feelings of those with higher social
status tend to be recognized and considered important." Cultural
scripts - influenced by the stories we hear many times a day in the
mainstream media as well as by dominant values and beliefs teach us to empathize with the emotions of those with power and to
regard the emotions of subordinates as less important and
understandable."
Martha McCluskey explores this point in an article describing
the privilege enjoyed by members of fraternities at Colby College in
1977 when she was a student and horrific levels of sexual
harassment were the norm.49 In her words:
When I was a Colby student, going to class meant getting up
early and sneaking out the freight tunnel to avoid the fraternity
pledges on the hall who blocked the doorways and held dorm
women captive until we watched them pull their pants down. It
meant risking the daily trauma of "frat row" (the central
thoroughfare of the campus that was lined with seven fraternity
houses), where we faced a gauntlet of fraternity men who
drenched us with buckets of water, chased us with large nets,
threw beer and other objects at us, yelled sexual insults at us,
and rated us as sex objects. Once, on her way across campus,
one of my roommates suffered a broken ear drum when she was
hit on the head and knocked off her bicycle by an object thrown
at her from a fraternity balcony.
Campus life meant eating lunch to the sounds of women
screaming in pain blasting from stereos from the tightly
47. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HoCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING 172 (1983); see also Martha T. McCluskey, Privileged Violence, Principled
Fantasy, and FeministMethod: The Colby FraternityCase, 44 ME. L. REV. 261,283-91 (1992)
(discussing fraternity violence against women and tendency of media and others to see men's
feelings in reaction to complaints as important and women's claims as trivial).
48. Spelman, infra note 71, at 271.
49. McCluskey, supra note 47, at 278-80.
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shuttered Lambda Chi house during "hell week." It meant
returning to our dorm rooms to find notes on our doors from
fraternity pledges containing sexual insults directed at us by
name. It meant waking up at night to find our fraternity pledge
classmates breaking into our dorm rooms in their underwear, or
maybe just smashing telephones and furniture in the halls. It
meant living with posters in my dormitory lounge listing which
fraternity pledge on my hall was named "da balls" of the week
and reporting whether he had accomplished sufficient sexual
harassment of dorm women to earn his title.5 °
In 1984, the college banned fraternities.'
problems continued:

Six years later,

Early [in 1990], the college had faced increasing problems of
fights, hazing, and vandalism in the dorms, reportedly caused by
Lambda Chi pledging activities. In March of 1990, the state
police were called to investigate a disturbance in a grange hall.
They discovered a group of fifty or more male Colby students
who said they were participating in a Lambda Chi initiation
ritual. A document signed by a list of pledges described the
ceremony establishing brotherhood through a process of
spanking, sliding naked on beer-soaked plastic, and severing the
heads of cows and chickens.52
The students were punished: graduating seniors were not allowed
to march in the graduation ceremonies, and others were suspended.
for a single semester.
Litigation followed, with the Maine Civil Liberties Union
representing the fraternity students.5 3 Colby College prevailed in
the litigation. After all, as one Justice noted at oral argument, if
Colby College must (under the Maine Civil Rights Act) admit those
it wishes "to exclude (fraternities), then [the Maine Civil Rights Act]
would also require Colby's fraternities to sacrifice their associational
values to tolerate those they want to exclude (women)."5 4
McClusky uses the media frenzy surrounding the dispute to
make her point about emotions:
Our society tends to interpret privileged white men's particular
emotional attachments as rational, universal principles, and to
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

278-79 (citations omitted).
267.
269 (citations omitted).
270.
273 (citations omitted).
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discount others' particular emotional attachments as personal
feelings. In the dominant ideology, privileged men's feelings are
principled; women's feelings are personal.55
Media accounts urged readers to imagine the feelings of the
punished fraternity brothers, not those "who had been terrorized by
Lambda Chi."56 For example, one article began by asking readers:
"Are you now, or have you ever been a member of a non-sanctioned
Greek letter association while attending Colby College in
Waterville? If the answer is yes, don't admit it ... unless you want
to be blackballed from your own graduation or suspended for a
semester."5 7
In another, the author imagined hearing a son on the football
team (most of the Lamda Chi brothers punished were on the football
team) telling his father that he had been kicked out of school for
joining a fraternity.' He considered this "wildly absurd:"
To play football without trying to win is more offensive to me
than any amount of hazing, beer drinking, or wolf whistles....
[Liosing is bad for a young man's soul.... [Colby's football]
program will become a laughingstock, all because a gang of
bleeding heart liberals decided fraternities are akin to the
Khmer Rouge and L.A. street gangs.59
McClusky quotes a law review article concerning the case which
suggests that men are more disadvantaged than women because
evidence of "widespread campus gang rape" indicates "that college
men suffer from lower self-confidence than women.' ° Reports on
the dispute, both in the popular media and in legal journals and law
reviews, constantly ignored or trivialized evidence of violence and
severe harassment by fraternity members."'
As another example of the "selective emphasis on protecting
privileged men's feelings," McClusky uses the controversy
surrounding Clarence Thomas' confirmation to the Supreme Court62
after Anita Hill's description of how he had sexually harassed her:
"Sensational imagery magnified the harm to Thomas from the
55. Id. at 282.
56. Id. at 283.

57. Id. (quoting FratAction May Violate Civil Rights, ME. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at 7).
58. Id. at 283-84.
59. Id. at 284 (quoting Tom Hanrahan, The Surreal State of Colby Football, CENT. ME.
MORNING SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 1990, at 13).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 285-87.
62. Id. at 287.
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accusations while bizarre speculations and contortions of the
evidence discounted and distanced the harm to Hill from any sexual
harassment. "'6 Here too, the principled side was identified as the
male (though not white, he was defended by powerful white males)
and the emotional side as his attacker.6 McClusky concludes: "Both
the Colby case and the Thomas hearings show how the male-biased
perceptions that dominate legal and popular culture magnify harm
to privileged men and minimize harm to others."'
One can also put this point in terms of cultural scripts that both
make sense of (make credible) the claims of the powerful and make
the claims of those who have been harmed by the powerful
incomprehensible and incredible.' Women and men become visible
and invisible under different conditions in patriarchal culture.
Women are invisible when they do something well, such as "raising
children into healthy adults or coming up with a brilliant idea at a
business meeting."67 Men, on the other hand, become invisible when
their behavior is socially undesirable and raises questions about the
appropriateness of male privilege.6 Similar points can be made
about visibility and race or class. An African-American man who
has committed a violent crime is likely to be quite visible as yet
another violent black man, though not visible as a violent man. 9
We tend to perceive and understand the world around us in ways
consistent with basic cultural beliefs and expectations. Our culture
is patriarchal, and these beliefs and expectations are formed by
patriarchal narratives - stories that make sense of the world
around us in terms consistent with our version of patriarchy. In
this culture, it is extremely difficult to protect women or children
from sexual violence and abuse because women and children who
complain about such violations tend not to be believed.7
.
Those with lower status are expected to be more emotional, but
they are expected to be more emotional in certain ways: women and
others in subordinate positions are, for example, expected to smile
63. Id. at 288-89.
64. Id. at 289.
65. Id. at 291.

66. For an analysis of the biases in the criminal justice system's response to rape
associated with cultural scripts, see Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW &
PHIL. 127 (1992).
67. ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OUR PATRIARCHAL LEGACY 156
(1997).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 157.
70. See, e.g., Symposium, The Abuse Excuse andPatriarchalNarratives,92 Nw. U. L. REv.
1459 (1998).
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and cry more than men but are not expected to be angry."1 Allison
Jaggar uses the term "outlaw emotions" to refer to subordinate's
inappropriate (according to the dominant culture) emotions.7 2 When
a member of a subordinate group expresses an outlaw emotion, her
assertion is likely to be found incredible (her report cannot be
accurate), unreasonable (her response was inappropriate and can
therefore be ignored), or unimportant (even if true and reasonable,
her response is of little weight).
Men are expected to be angry and their anger is easily
understood, while women are not expected to be angry.73 , Elizabeth
Spelman explains that women's anger at men is inappropriate
because "[tlo be angry at him is to make myself, at least on this
occasion, his judge - to have, and to express, a standard against
which I assess his conduct." 4 Denial of the reality and legitimacy
of women's anger is a way to deny women agency.78 The cultural
denial of anger to women is part of women's systemic subordination
because "the existence and expression of anger [is] an act of
insubordination. 7 S
These cultural biases make it difficult to empathize with
battered women. Indeed, their anger is not likely to be perceived as
credible. Battered women are a relatively powerless group - they
are not expected to be angry. Further, their anger suggests they see
themselves as moral agents with the capacity and the right to stand
in judgment of the men in their lives.
In this section, I have discussed a number of cognitive biases:
(1) our tendency to categorize others as members of ingroups and
outgroups and to assume that all members of an outgroup are more
similar to each other than they are and more different from
ourselves than they are; (2) our tendency to overestimate the extent
to which a person's behavior reflects fundamental personality
characteristics and to overestimate the extent to which it reflects
the situation in which the person finds herself or himself; (3) our
71. See, e.g., Calhoun, supra note 6, at 224; Elizabeth V. Spelman, Anger and
Insubordination, in WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS IN FEMINIST

PHILOSOPHY 263, 264 (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989).
72. Alison M. Jaggar, Love andKnowledge: Emotionin FeministEpistemology, in WOMEN,
KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY: EXPLORATIONS N FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 129, 144 (Ann Garry &
Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989).
73. Id. at 143-44; MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY
3-4 (1983); Spelman, supra note 71, at 264; Catherine Lutz, Emotion, Thought, and
Estrangement:Emotion as a CulturalCategory, 1 J. SOC'YCULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 287,299
(1986).
74. Spelman, supra note 71, at 266.
75. Id. at 267.
76. Id. at 270.
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tendency to stereotype individuals who we see as members of groups
and to turn descriptive stereotypes into prescriptive stereotypes; (4)
our tendency to empathize with the emotions of the powerful and to
deny that the powerless feel emotions considered inappropriate for
them by their culture; and (5) our tendency to deny that those in
subordinate positions can be angry, and legitimately so. Each of
these biases will cause problems for battered women in courtrooms,
as explored below.
IV. BATTERED WOMEN, ANGER, JEALOUSY, AND DEPENDENCE
The stereotype of battered women is that they are - passive
victims wholly controlled by their abusers. They have learned to be
always, and only, helpless and passive victims. They are not angry
or jealous, but sad and fearful (unless they enjoy violence directed
at themselves). They are completely isolated socially and without
friends. They are entirely dependent on their batterers financially
and in all other ways.
In the previous section, I explored how difficult it is in our
culture to understand and empathize with the anger of women
because, in general, anger is an "outlaw emotion" for women, to use
Allison Jaggar's term." Because of stereotypes of battered women
as passive and fearful, anger is likely to be particularly difficult for
us to recognize, understand, and empathize with when expressed by
battered women. Although our culture does generally recognize
that women can be jealous,7' for battered women jealousy is also an
"outlaw emotion." If battered women are wholly passive and dependent, seeking always and only to please their abusers, then they
cannot be jealous.
Reality is, of course, far more complex. Battered women are far
more like "us" (non-battered people) than we would like to believe
and are often angry and jealous. In a study of couples in Seattle, 7
Neil Jacobson and John Gottman observed arguments of severely
violent couples and compared them to arguments of other couples.' °

77. Jaggar, supra note 72, at 144.
78. Spelman, supra note 71, at 264.
79. NEIL JACOBSON & JOHN GOrrmAN,

WHEN MEN BATrER WOMEN: NEW INSIGHTS INTO

ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 18 (1998),

80. Id. at 19-20. Couples were recruited "mostly through public-service announcements
in the local media." Id. at 24. They were paid "at least $160 for their participation." Id. at 26.
They videotaped couples after asking them to discuss an issue causing conflict in their
marriage. Id. at 27. They also used electronic sensors to measure arousal during the
argument. Id.
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Consistent with stereotypes of battered women, Jacobson and
Gottman found that severe violence "is always accompanied by
emotional abuse, is often accompanied by injury, and is virtually
always associated with fear and even terror on the part of the
battered woman."81 They also found, however, that many battered
women fought back verbally, and that those who did were more
likely to leave their batterers within the two-year follow-up period. 2
They found battered women "resourceful, courageous, and in many
ways heroic. "'
They discovered that battered women are angry: "Most people
get angry when they are insulted and degraded. So do battered
women."" Indeed, they found that "the battered women were just
as angry, if not angrier, than their husbands were. "' They report:
In fact, battered women appear to respond during arguments both violent and nonviolent - much as one would expect. When
you're being abused, you are bound to be scared, but you are also
bound to be angry. We saw much effort on the part of battered
contain their anger, but it tended to leak out
women to
86
anyway.

Anger is a normal emotion for anyone in such a situation; it is an
emotion experienced by human beings when they are physically or
psychologically abused.
Battered women often challenge their partners about behavior
they consider inappropriate. 7 They often fight back verbally and

81. Id. at 25. Jacobson and Gottman designed the study so as not to put battered women.
at greater risk:
To be confident that we were not putting battered women in jeopardy, we
developed a set of procedures to help assess the risk of violence to ensure that
no couples left the laboratory until the risk was minimal. We designed our
debriefing procedures with the help of... a nationally respected clinician
specializing in domestic violence. All battered women were given referrals for
shelters, and individual psychological and legal counseling after each session.
They were asked privately whether they felt safe, and if they felt that the
argument in the laboratory would put them at risk of physical aggression. If a
woman felt unsafe, we constructed a safety plan.
Id. at 26. They also called the wives after the study was completed to determine whether
their participation resulted in any violence. Id. at 27. In no case was there any indication
that the study had caused violence.
82. Id. at 28, 32.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id. at 66.
86. Id at 66-67.
87. Id. at 59-60.
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Battered women who stay in
sometimes even physically.'
relationships have not given up hope that their partner will change:
They are holding on to a dream that they have about what life
could be like with these men. They love their husbands and they
have developed a sympathy for them and their plight in life.
They hope that they can help their men become normal
husbands and fathers. These dreams can be powerful and are
very hard to give up.89
In addition to continuing love, some relationships involve traumatic
bonding, which occurs when love and violence are combined: "There
is a very strong bond created by the violence being paired with love
and it makes leaving very difficult."'
Psychological abuse often includes the abuser's infidelity.
Jacobson and Gottman describe this exchange between an abusive
man, Dave, and his partner, Judy:
Judy opened a letter from a doctor documenting that Dave had
been tested for sexually transmitted diseases. When she
confronted him about it, Dave taunted her: "Why do you think?
Because I fucked some other chicks." She began to sob, and
yelled, "How could you?" He kept taunting her: "Don't you get
it? I'm bored!" She pressed him for details, and he finally
admitted that he had slept with "some chick in the back of my
truck." Judy lost her temper. She began yelling and swearing
at him. She was enraged and flooded by feelings of being
betrayed, unappreciated, and unloved. 1
Sexual humiliation "was a dominant theme" in Dave's relationship
with Judy.92 If Judy refused to do something sexual because she
found it "degrading or disgusting," he would "threaten to have
affairs."93
Jacobson and Gottman describe another couple for whom the
batterer's infidelities were an aspect of his emotional abuse for

88. Malcolm Gordon, Validity of "Battered Woman Syndrome" in Criminal CasesInvolving Battered Women, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS INFAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND

POLICY IMPLIcATIONS 64, 65 (Nat'l Inst. Just. & A.B.A. eds., 1998).
89. JACOBSON & GOrTMAN, supra note 79, at 51 (1998).
90. Id. at 167.
91. Id. at 126.
92. Id. at 150.
93. Id.
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many years: Roy and Helen.'
a new town for a fresh start:

Once, after Helen and Roy moved to

Helen bought Roy a $75 necklace. They were sitting in a bar
when she gave it to him. She had quit drinking, but he was
drunk. In walked one of his ex-lovers. Roy disappeared for
about half an hour, and when Helen asked him where he had
been, he said that he had given this woman the necklace and ten
dollars, and in return he received fellatio from her. 5
Battered women feel jealousy just like other people in
relationships feel jealousy when a partner is unfaithful. But for
battered women, the response to infidelity is complicated by his
deliberate use of his infidelity to hurt her.
Many battered women support their partners economically.
Helen, one of the most "severely batted women" in the JacobsonGottman sample,' was a hotel receptionist; her husband Roy was
an unemployed "alcoholic and heroin addict."97 Another couple in
the Jacobson-Gottman sample was Martha and Don. When the
study began, Martha had been severely beaten by Don twenty times
in the preceding year, but she worked as a mental health case
worker.98 Not only did Martha have a job, she had friends; one
beating followed her going out to dinner with a friend after work."
Indeed, Gottman and Jacobson report that not all batterers are
emotionally dependent on the woman they abuse.' ° These
emotionally independent batterers "encouraged their wives to be
independent." 1
In the earlier discussion of cognitive biases, I stressed our need
to see battered women as different from ourselves and to deny that
they can feel anger orjealousy. Battered women respond emotionally very much like others. When demeaned, humiliated, and beaten,
they become angry and often express their anger. Sometimes they
start fights, as Judy did when she confronted Dave about his being

94. Id. at 97-100, 150-51.
95. Id. at 99.
96. Roy had broken Helen's back on one occasion and her neck on another. He caused
eight miscarriages by refusing to use birth control and beating her whenever she became
pregnant. Id. at 52.
97. Id. at 52, 131 (discussing Cheryl, another woman who was severely abused physically
as well as psychologically, who "worked and had a respected profession").
98. Id. at 114.
99. Id. at 71.
100. Id. at 30.
101. Id.
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tested for sexually-transmitted diseases.'12 Moreover, they are not
always economically dependent on their partners, nor are they
always socially isolated.
V. OUR CLIENTS' STORIES AND SYLVIA'S STORY

A. Our Clients' Stories
In the 1990s, I was involved in the Illinois Clemency Project for
Battered Women. We filed clemency petitions for a number of
women in prison for killing or injuring or trying to hire someone to
kill an abusive spouse. 03 When we were first organizing the project,
Margaret Byrne, who became the Director of the Project and who
had filed a number of such clemency petitions in the past, warned
us that the women we would represent would be far from perfect,
that we would be working with "bad facts.""
Most of our clients did have "bad facts." 105 Many of our clients
had substance abuse problems of one kind or another. Alcohol and
drugs are used by many women who face domestic violence, and
alcoholism and drug abuse are "bad facts." Some clients had been
feisty, far from passive, and fought back verbally or physically."°
These are normal and healthy responses but "bad facts." Some had
a boyfriend in the background. Although they may have desperately needed a boyfriend's support, this was yet another "bad
fact."107 Some had been angry and jealous of abusers, who had used
infidelities to hurt them, but when a woman is on trial for murder,
her anger and jealousy are very "bad facts.""~ Some used vulgar
language and had been less than perfect ladies. Living under a
regime of abuse and terror does not produce perfect ladies, but
failing to be one is a "bad fact."'
As we prepared petitions, I came to know the stories of a
number of women and gained greater understanding of exactly how
and why the legal system had repeatedly failed them. Over the
102. Many other examples of battered women raising issues likely to lead to a fight are
given throughout JACOBSON & GOrrMAN, supra note 79.
103. We were successful in obtaining the release of four women and the commutation of
another woman's sentence. The vast majority of our petitions were, however, turned down.
104. Personal Experience, Illinois Clemency Project for Battered Women (1993-1994) (on
file with author).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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years since, I have often wondered why the disputes in the law
journals over issues relevant to battered women who kill have so
little resonance in terms of how our clients ended up in prisons
following convictions.
Two major problems stand out. First, and this was the only
problem for the vast majority of our clients: they were represented
by public defenders who had not asked about domestic violence and
they (our clients) plead guilty in exchange for a murder conviction
with a sentence of twenty or thity years in prison." ° In one
particularly dramatic set of cases, a mother and daughter received
twenty and twenty-eight years, respectively, in exchange for guilty
pleas to attempted murder. They were represented by a single
public defender (despite conflicts of interest between them)."' The
public defender interviewed them together once or twice for about
fifteen minutes on the edge of a courtroom." He asked nothing
about violence or abuse, though the daughter had been sexually
abused by the man they sought to kill (who was uninjured and
ended up with custody of another child when the mother went to
jail). In fact, she had been sexually abused from the time she was
six until she was a young adult, and the mother had been brutally
abused for well over a decade."
Many women who have been
abused are likely to be hostile or passive when interviewed by
defense counsel. Many are unlikely themselves to bring up the
issue of abuse. In many cases, what is necessary is careful and
sensitive probing by defense counsel who are aware that abuse may
be a factor in any case in which a woman has killed or injured (or
hired someone to kill or injure) an intimate partner. Needless to
say, this does not always happen.
In another case, our client did tell her public defender that her
husband had consumed a couple of thousand dollars of cocaine that
weekend, was coming at her with a crazed look, and that she killed
him in self-defense."" Her public defender told her that the autopsy
report showed he was clean." When we had a doctor look at the
autopsy report, we discovered that although he did not have cocaine
in his blood, he did have a large quantity of the substance into
which cocaine breaks down after being ingested.16
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 8:1

In sum, the major problem for most of our clients was they were
represented by public defenders who spent little time on their cases
and convinced them to accept a guilty plea of murder or attempted
murder with a sentence of twenty to thirty years. It was of no
matter whether experts testified in terms of a syndrome or in terms
of the experiences of battered women. Nor did it matter whether the
immanence required for self-defense could encompass a sleeping
spouse, another recent controversy.117 All that mattered was that
they were poor, could not afford high-powered private attorneys, and
were represented by public defenders with no resources to pay for
investigators and far too little time.
A very, very few of our clients did have trials."" But even for
these women, the controversies in the law reviews and journals
seemed off the mark."9 The biggest problem, it seemed to me, was
how easy it was to make a battered woman who has killed or
attempted to kill her batterer look bad given the prosecutor's ability
to make just about any argument, no matter how unfair and
prejudicial because of its appeal to biases and cultural scripts.'20
For example, for one of our clients (Janice),' 2 ' who did go to
trial, the evidence of abuse was incontrovertible.'22 She had kept a
diary for years detailing the abuse, and the diary could not have
been written between the time of the killing and the time of her
arrest.' Yet the prosecutor was allowed to argue that a recent law
school graduate, a feminist in defense counsel's office, had
fabricated the allegations of domestic violence.2 4 This client had
been subject to unspeakable abuse for years. 25 During that time,
she had had four abortions, each a combination of physical and
emotional abuse by her husband Steven.2O Janice had one child and
desperately wanted another one.127 Steven repeatedly convinced her
that now was the right time, and she would become pregnant. 28
After she was pregnant, he would then insist that now was not the
117. Two issues that have provoked considerable scholarly commentary in recent years. See
infra notes 503-04 and accompanying text.
118. Personal Experience, Illinois Clemancy Project for Battered Women (1993-1994) (on
file with author).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Not her real name.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Not his real name.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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right time and tell her to get an abortion (unless she wanted him to
perform an abortion on her himself, which he had done to another
woman in the past). Of course, Janice got an abortion each time. 9
The prosecutor turned this abuse against her, arguing that her four
abortions showed that she had no regard for human life.a °

Our clients also seemed to face a double-bind in terms of class.
If poor, they were unable to afford a private lawyer and unlikely to
proceed to trial - indeed, it was unlikely that anyone would ever
hear of their abuse at the hands of the deceased. 3 ' But if middle
class - and able to hire a lawyer, though not necessarily a very
good one, let alone one with experience in such cases - they looked
bad because, after all, they had options."32 Surely, a woman with a
portable sauna in her garage did not need to kill to escape an
abusive situation. 13
The Clemency Projects cases were not, of course, a random
sample representative ofwhat generally happens to women who kill
or attempt to kill their abusers. We did not see the cases in which
the system responded more appropriately: those in which the
prosecutor did not charge the woman with a crime, or in which
defense counsel did a great job and either succeeded in obtaining an
acquittal or a reduced charge in exchange for a plea. In Cook
County, the public defender's office has a special task force devoted
to first degree murder cases with a reduced caseload, and many of
those attorneys are as good or better than any private attorney. But
even in Cook County, women who have killed abusers face
problems, as illustrated by the fact that three of our clients, all
described above, were represented
by Cook County public defenders
3
who did not do an adequate job.
Based on our clients' (admittedly non representative)
experiences, I would urge that if all battered women who kill are to
have a fair trial with the opportunity to make a claim of selfdefense, two things are absolutely necessary. First, we must fund
the public defender system more adequately, so that defenders have
fewer cases and resources for investigation." 5 It is one thing for
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The mother and daughter, see supra text accompanying notes 111-13, and the woman
who explained that her abuser had consumed $2,000 worth of cocaine before lunging at her,
see supra text accompanying notes 114-16, were all represented by lawyers from the Cook
County Public Defender's Office.
135. No such resources are available at the present time, though prosecutors have the
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prosecutors to have so many cases that they must convince their
clients to accept whatever deal is offered. There is no meaningful
consent when a person is too poor to hire their own lawyer, knows
nothing of the legal system, and is assured by the public defender
that this is the best that can be done.
Second, we need to limit the kinds of arguments prosecutors can
make in cases in which battered women have killed or hired
someone to kill an abusive partner. It is so easy to make a battered
woman look like a bad woman, a reality that should not be
surprising given the many cognitive biases which are likely to
interfere with our ability to understand and empathize with a
woman who has been in an abusive relationship, as discussed
earlier. 3 6
In the remainder of this section, I use the facts of a recent New
Jersey case to illustrate this second set of problems. Although there
is no reported decision, the case has the advantage of being covered
by Court TV with daily summaries of the trial. The case attracted
a fair amount of media attention, including "20/20's" airing of a 911
tape recorded when the woman called the police asking for an escort
just before going home and killing her husband.'3 7 We therefore
know more about the facts and background of this case than we do
about recorded cases, when we read only what judges have chosen
to tell.
B. Sylvia's Story
Born around 1943, Sylvia Ashby grew up in Virginia.'38 Her
father was a violent disciplinarian who abused Sylvia's mother and
beat Sylvia so severely that her mother insisted she "marry at 14
just to get of the house."3 9 Sylvia never graduated from high
school.'" By the time she met John Flynn, she had been married
and divorced five times."'
police to serve as their investigators.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 109-35.

137. The police gave her no escort; they called the husband and sounded quite sympathetic
to his plight.
138. Court TV Online, Trial Opens with Conflicting Portraitsof Sylvia Flynn (Sept. 25,
2000), at http://courttv.com/trialslflynn/092500_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Day One of Flynn Trial] (on file with author); Court TV Online, Mistress Testifies
about Defendant'sJealous, Obsessive Behavior (Sept. 27, 2000), at http://courttv.com/trials/
flynn/092700_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Day Three of Flynn Trial] (on
file with author).
139. Day One of Flynn Trial, supra note 138; Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
140. See Day One of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
141. Carol Gorga Williams, Police Allege Man Posed as a Doctor, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct.
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Around 1962, she and her second husband had a son, Paul
Scearce. 42 Her second husband divorced Sylvia and received
custody of Paul, claiming that she abandoned the child.' After the
divorce, Paul saw his mother on weekends until some point in the
1970s when she moved out of town with John Flynn, who was to be
her sixth husband.
Her third husband died in an automobile crash.'" Although she
told friends that the couple's two-week old son John Wesley Barker,
III, also died in the crash, he survived. Sylvia "turned him over to"
45
her dead husband's sister and allowed her to adopt him.
According to the adopting mother, Sylvia never visited the child
though she was free to do so." According
to Sylvia, the adopting
147
mother would not allow her to visit.

Sylvia and John Flynn began dating in 1970, though they did
not marry until 1997.11 At the beginning of the relationship, "he
was a dashing salesman."'
They had both been divorced and
"vowed that theirs would be the one to last."50
John Flynn "was a self-employed salesman who experienced
several business setbacks and declared bankruptcy in 1995." 1"'
Sylvia owned her own beauty shop. 5 2 According to Sylvia and many
others, John abused her physically and psychologically throughout
their relationship. He was "'belligerent and obnoxious and
condescending, and a womanizer,' said Lynne Ferraro, a friend and
client of Sylvia Flynn. A neighbor described him as 'disrespectful,
derogatory, and insulting,' his sister labeled him violent' and 'out of
control,' and a5 3 former fishing pal called him 'degrading and
demoralizing.'"

5, 2000, at B4.
142. Id.; Court TV Online, Defense's Own Expert Offers Tepid Support for Flynn (Oct. 2,
2000), at http://courttv.contrials/flynn/100200ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Day Five of Flynn Trial] (on file with author).
143. Police Allege Man, supra note 141; Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
144. PoliceAllege Man, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Court TV Online, Victim or Victimizer? N.J. Jury Must Decide (Sept. 22, 2000), at
http'//courttv.com/trials/flynn/092200_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Case
Background of Flynn Trial] (on file with author).
149. ABC News, Betrayed by the Police; Woman Kills Husbandafter not Being Able to Get
Help From Police, 20/20, June 2, 2000.
150. Id.
151. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supranote 148.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Dorothy and Steven Hart, John's sister and brother-in-law,
experienced John's violence first hand during a 1995 dispute in a
nursing home over how best to care for Dorothy and John's elderly
mother. 154 Steven Hart, who had multiple sclerosis and walked with
a cane, was thrown against a wall by John Flynn during this
altercation. 55 Steven recorded the event on audio tape. 5 6 On the

tape, Steven can be heard saying: "Please do not get physical."" z
John Flynn (as he picked Steven Flynn "up by the lapels, and tossed
[him] across the hallway") responded: "Get your ass to the wall, you
understand." 5 ' Steven then says (on the tape): "Call the police.
Call the police now. Call 911 because my brother-in-law just threw
me against the wall and is now assaulting his sister."' According
to Steven: "He was totally out of control. He was absolutely going
nuts."' 6 After Steven signed a complaint with the police against
John, John "left a threatening message of his [Steven's] answering
machine, calling Hart a 'dead man.'"'6 '
Dorothy and Steven Hart's son reported that John Flynn had
beaten "him and his younger siblings with a belt when they were
teenagers in the 1970s "for no apparent reason." 62 John had been
drinking heavily.'" Frank Hart, John's nephew and godson, said:
"he wasn't a nice guy, even to his relatives. He was a mean person.
He was a monster."64
Leonard Belcaro, an ex-police officer, had been a fishing buddy
of John Flynn's and had served on the board of a fishing club with
him. 65 Len eventually "broke off his friendship with John when he
became disgusted with how badly he treated Sylvia."" But "to his
horror, John started harassing him [Len] with phone calls and
threats."67 Belcaro received a number of threatening calls from
John, culminating in one night when John called "15 to 20 times
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. ABC News, supra note 149.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Court TV Online, Witnesses Paint Husband as Madman, Wife as Victim (Sept. 28,
2000), at http://courttv.com/trials/flynn/092800_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Day Four of Flynn Trial] (on file with author).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. ABC News, supra note 149 (Tom Jarriel speaking).
167. Id.
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between midnight and three o'clock in the morning."1" John Flynn
"said that he was going to blow up my house, he said he was going
to blow up my boat."" 9 Belcaro took his off-duty gun (from when he
had been a police officer) and "went outside in the backyard and I
I waited for John."' 0
sat there
Over and
the years,
a number of people - including John's sister
Dorothy Hart' - saw Sylvia with signs of physical abuse such as
bruises and black eyes.' Dorothy Hart described John as "always
'in the abusive mode' with Sylvia Flynn, constantly berating her
with vulgar names."7 3 According to Dorothy, Sylvia "was totally
subservient to him. She just cringed when he spoke."" 4 Both
Steven and Dorothy Hart recalled a Thanksgiving dinner at John's
house in 1980.1 s John was displeased with something, likely the
food, and "slung profanities at his wife, grabbed her and pushed her
back into the kitchen."7 6
Phyllis Roberts, one of Sylvia's clients and a friend, recalled
seeing Sylvia "with bruises on three occasions in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. One was so severe ... that she gasped when Flynn
removed her dark glasses." 7 7 Roberts also witnessed John verbally
abuse Sylvia." 7 1 Once when she "tried to intervene," John "told her,
'You shut your f***ing mouth, bitch or else'" and Sylvia begged
Roberts never to interfere in their arguments again, explaining that
"he'll only take it out on me later." 7 9 Roberts urged Sylvia to leave,
but Sylvia "replied, 'He'll only come after me. He'll kill me, I know
he will."' °
John Flynn routinely demeaned Sylvia in front of others.
According to Roberts, John once "reduced his wife to tears at the
Sylvia asked him to dance. John
wedding of a mutual friend."'
"snapped, 'I don't dance with fat cows' and then compared her to his

168. Id. (speaker not identified but testimony at trial indicates that this was Leonard
Belcaro); see Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
ABC News, supra note 149.
Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
Id.

173. Id.
174. Id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

181. Id.
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other girlfriends and mocked her poor grammar."82 Another
witness reported that Sylvia was "roundly mocked by her husband
for her poor grammar.""u One month prior to the shooting, "John
Flynn said loudly at a party for his son's wedding that he was
planning to divorce his wife."'
John Belcaro, the ex-police officer who was harassed and
threatened by John Flynn, as described above, 85 recalled seeing
Sylvia reduced to tears at a dinner party at his house. According to
Belcaro, "Flynn hurled insult after insult at his wife until she
dissolved in tears. He said he watched Flynn look on as the other
women at the party comforted Sylvia ...

[Belcaro] looked at him

and he just settled back in his chair with a smirk and a look on his
face like he'd accomplished something. " '

John Flynn was sexually abusive as well. According to Sylvia,
he routinely raped her.8I 7 And his own sexual infidelities were a
form of psychological abuse. According to Sylvia, he had "affairs
with a dozen different women.""s According to his secretary, he had
as many as twenty-four affairs "during the two-year period she
worked for him and made travel arrangements."8 9
Sylvia's brother reported that John, who he considered
"controlling and overbearing," isolated his sister from her family."9
Leonard Ashby "said it broke his mother's heart that Flynn would
never let his sister visit the family at holidays."' 9 '
Sylvia tried to escape a number of times. Twice during the
1970s, Sylvia's son David Scearce and his father moved Sylvia Flynn
from the home she shared with John in Philadelphia to her family's
home in Virginia. 92 On both occasions, John tracked her down and
persuaded her to return with him. 93 The first occasion was in
December, 1976; David, then 14, cried "but she said she had to
182. Id.
183. Id.

184. Court TV Online, Defendant Threatened to Kill Her Husband if he tried to Leave,
Relative Says (Sept. 26, 2000), at httpI/courttv.com/trials/flynn/092600_ctv.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Day Two of Flynn Trial] (on file with author).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
186. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
187. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
188. Id.
189. Carol Gorga Williams, Threat Showed Husband'sRage, Lawyer Says, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Oct. 1, 2000, at A17.
190. Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
191. Id. On cross-examination, Ashby admitted that he only knew about John causing the
problem from his sister. Id.
192. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
193. Id.
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During the second attempt a year later, when John arrived
in the area, Sylvia "hid herself in the attic."195 According to David,
Sylvia emerged from her hiding place only when Sylvia's mother
"phoned, saying John Flynn was at her house and was refusing to
leave." 1" John had some problem with his toupee and wouldn't go
out in public until Sylvia went to her mother's, "fixed the toupee,
and accompanied John Flynn back home."'
Sylvia's friend Lynn Ferraro "urged Flynn to get a divorce, and
helped her move out of the house and into the home of another
friend in 1997 when John Flynn was away on business. When he
returned, however, he harassed the friend until she insisted Sylvia
Flynn leave."'9 8 It may have been at this time that John left this
message on the home of someone with whom Sylvia was staying:
"[there's a warrant being sworn out against you, personally, lady,
and Sylvia. And I think you're in a lot more trouble for harboring
a fugitive than you realize. I'm sorry for you."'
According to
Sylvia's friend Lynn Ferraro: "He had abused her friends so much
with threats and telephone calls that nobody could, you know,
nobody could take a chance on letting her in."2" Sylvia said she
tried to escape four times, but we do not know the details of the
fourth attempt.
Although not all batterers display the cycle of violence in which
abuse is followed by remorse, John Flynn did. According to Sylvia,
he would beat and rape her and then "cry and beg my forgiveness,
but then he would do it again the next week."2 ' After raping her,
he would insist that she sleep in his arms. "°
In January of 1997, Sylvia pointed a gun at John but itjammed
(it did apparently go off, but no one was hurt)."3 At some point,
presumably in reference to this incident, Sylvia told her friend Lynn
Ferraro that "she had fired a gun into the ceiling of the home 'to get
him to stop hitting her.'"2"
go."'

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
199. ABC News, supra note 149 (playing answering-machine tape on the air of John leaving
this message at the home of a friend with whom Sylvia was staying).
200. Id.
201. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
202. ABC News, supra note 149.
203. Day Two of Flynn Trial, supra note 184.
204. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
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On May 16, 1997, Sylvia'Flynn filed domestic violence charges
against John Flynn.m John told the police "it was Sylvia, not him,
who was violent."' ° "He claimed that several months earlier, his
companion had attempted to shoot him with a handgun, and the
weapon discharged a bullet into the ceiling." 7 He reported this
incident and surrendered the gun to the prosecutor's office on May
16, 1997, the same day Sylvia filed charges of domestic violence
against him.2'
In September, 1997, shortly after their marriage on August 12,
Sylvia came to the police station to report that John "had beaten her
with a shoe and shoved her head through a kitchen wall."2' That
fall, she "had a restraining order against him, but had it rescinded
a month later. The charges against Flynn were dropped when he
agreed to get counseling."21 ° But he never went.21 He was supposed
to meet with "Valerie Brown, a psychiatric social worker, in
December 1997... to determine if he needed marriage or couples
counseling," but Sylvia, not John, showed up.2 '2 Brown reported
that Sylvia "said John Flynn had hit her only once in the last two
years," a version inconsistent with what Sylvia "had given
authorities in May 1997. " '21 Although Valerie gave Sylvia some

information about a shelter, according to Brown Sylvia was not
"terribly interested."21' Brown regarded Sylvia as "so imbedded in
21 5
the conflict of the marriage that she really didn't want to get out."

Brown would later tell the jury at Sylvia's murder trial that Sylvia
did not "present the typical 'markers' of battered woman's
syndrome, which she described as helplessness, hopelessness,
isolation from family and friends and financial dependence."216
In August of 1998, Sylvia opened John's mail and discovered
that "he was carrying on an affair with a New York woman named

205. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Carol Gorga Williams, Jury is Selected in Fatal Shooting of Spouse, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Sept. 21, 2000, at B2.
209. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
210. Id.
211. Carol Gorga Williams, Dispatch Tapes Key to Defense, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Nov. 30,
1999, at B1.
212. Carol Gorga Williams, "IWas Afraid of Her Voice;" Slain Man's Girlfriend Says She
Lived in Fear of Wife's Stalking, Phone Threats, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 28, 2000, at B 1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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Linda Chiecko."217 When John called from California, "Flynn
confronted him and demanded that he end the relationship. He was
irate, and promised her 'a beating' when he returned home."218 He
also said: "When I get home, I'm going to kill you." 219 Linda Chieko
was traveling with him in California. 22
On Saturday, August 15, 1998, Sylvia Flynn, a grandmotherlylooking woman of 57 - killed her husband John Flynn, 55.221 He
222
had returned from California early that Saturday morning.
According to Sylvia, she spent Friday night in a locked spare room
"before she left to go shopping,"223 though a neighbor reported seeing
"her sitting on her front porch drinking coffee at 9:15 a.m." 224

While Sylvia was out shopping that Saturday, John called her
225
on her cell phone to invite her home for an "anniversary dinner."
Sylvia believed the dinner was a "hoax, and that her husband
She did not go home
wanted to lure her home to beat her."'
immediately, though records indicated that she called home six
times after receiving John's invitation, and left a message on Linda
Chiecko's answering machine "asking if she should go to the
anniversary dinner cooked by 'my husband, your boyfriend."'227 At
some point on that Saturday, Sylvia told Lynn Ferraro that she was
"scared to go home again. [She had] no where to sleep."22
At her friend George Werner's urging,22 Sylvia called the police
and asked for an escort home.' On the tape of the call, Sylvia can
be heard saying: "He threatened my life. I'm scared to go home
again.

I have nowhere to sleep." 23 '

Ed Byrnes, the dispatcher,

called John instead:

217. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.

218. Id.
219. ABC News, supra note 149. It is not clear whether these are two versions of the same
threat made in a single phone call or different threats in made in one or more phone calls.

220. Court TV Online, Flynn Escapes Murder Conviction but is Found Guilty of Lesser
Charge, at http://courttv.com/trials/flynn/verdictctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Verdict of Flynn Trial] (on file with author).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. Their second wedding anniversary had been three days earlier, when John was
in California with Chiecko.
226. Verdict of Flynn Trial, supra note 220.
227. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
228. ABC News, supra note 149.
229. Id.
230. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
231. ABC News, supra note 149; Day One of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
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Mr. Flynn: Hello.
Mr. Byrnes: Is this Mr. Flynn?
Mr. Flynn: Speaking.
Mr. Byrnes: Hi, how are you doing? Ed Byrnes, Brick
Township Police Department.
Mr. Flynn: Yeah.
Mr. Byrnes: Your wife called here, wanted us to bring her
home.
Mr. Flynn: What's her problem?
Mr. Byrnes: I don't know.
Mr. Flynn: Is she drunk?
Mr. Byrnes: She doesn't sound sober.
Mr. Flynn: That's what I thought.
Mr. Byrnes: But she wants to come home and she called us
for some reason.
Mr. Flynn: There's no reason why she can't come home.
Just tell her to come home. I don't want the police here again.
[break in play of tape - not clear whether something is skipped]
Mr. Flynn: This broad is something else. She's drunk half
the time.
Mr. Byrnes: Mmmm. OK, I'll contact her and I'll have her
go on home.
Mr. Flynn: OK 2
Ed Byrnes then called Sylvia back.
Mr. Byrnes: I just spoke to your husband.
Ms. Flynn: You did?
Mr. Byrnes: And there's absolutely no reason why you can't
go home.
Ms. Flynn: Because I'm scared to go home. I'm afraid hell
kill me. I'm afraid hell beat me up.
Mr. Byrnes: I spoke to him and he says there's absolutely
no problem why you can't go home, in fact he wants you to come
2 33
home.
After the shooting, Sylvia said Byrnes' statement - that he had
spoken with John and that everything was all right, she could go
home - reassured her and that she would not otherwise have
returned home.'
232. ABC News, supra note 149.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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According to Sylvia, she crept quietly into the house, but John
"saw her passing by his home office and shouted, 'You bitch, you
called the police on me again.'"2" At one point she told investigators
that her husband "was reaching for her throat when she closed her
eyes and emptied the gun." 6 At another point, she explained that
he started getting up from his desk chair when she closed her eyes
and fired. 7 Sylvia shot six bullets at him, one missed, one hit his
left arm, one his head, and three entered his upper chest.' Sylvia
explained, "I knew he was going to beat the hell out of me or kill me
again. I just couldn't take no more." 9 Sylvia went to the police
station, turned over the gun and reported that she had killed her
husband. 2" After the shooting, Sylvia repeatedly affirmed her love
for John Flynn.241
For several weeks after the shooting, Sylvia stayed with
Leonard Belcaro, the ex-police officer who had been harassed and
threatened by John.242 She turned down a plea bargain "which
required her to plead guilty to aggravated manslaughter and serve
a little more than 10 years in jail before becoming eligible for
parole."2
Prior to opening arguments at Sylvia's trial, the press reported
that the prosecution would argue that she murdered John Flynn out
of jealousy - she knew John intended to leave her for his mistress
and didn't want anyone else to have him if she couldn't.2 "
Prosecutors also said that evidence on Battered Woman Syndrome
"should not be presented to the jury because there was no history of
abuse."" Rather, Sylvia was "a woman scorned" and angry "over
her husband's affair with Linda Chieko."2" Also in pre-trial press
reports, the prosecution indicated that they would call cousins of
John's who would testify that Sylvia had said she would kill John if
the affair did not end - and that she would "beat a conviction" if
she did so. 47 Finally, reported the press, the state "is likely to argue
235. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148; ABC News, supra note 149.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
ABC News, supra note 149.
Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
ABC News, supra note 149.
Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.

241. Id. At the time of the killing, they shared a home in Brick Township, "a large

sprawling suburb in Ocean County," New Jersey. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
242. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
243. Case Background of Flynn Trial, supranote 148.

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.

247. Id.
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that the physical evidence supports an ambush rather than selfdefense."2
In his opening statement, Sylvia's lawyer William Farley
"described a life marred by abuse" with a father who "beat her so
severely that her mother insisted her daughter marry at 14 just to
get out of the house."249 He described her 28-year relationship with
John Flynn as "invested with abuse," noting that Sylvia "endured
'verbal, physical, emotional and sexual abuse' from her husband,
and [that] when she tried to get away, he pulled her back with force
of tears or remorse."' He argued that she acted out of self-defense:
three decades of abuse put Sylvia Flynn in fear for her
"Almost
25 l
life."
The prosecutor, Michel Paulhus, "told jurors that the evidence
reflected murder not abuse and that the 'physical evidence' would
show [that] John Flynn was seated and facing away from his wife
when she shot him."252 According to Paulhus, Sylvia had been

trying to "rewrite history because she's trying to get away with
murder."25 The truth, he asserted, is that Sylvia "was jealous and
angry about her husband's mistress;" she threatened to shot both of
them, and she "delivered on half of that promise" by killing her
husband on August 15.
On the first day of the trial, after the opening arguments, the
prosecution began its case, presenting evidence about Sylvia's
confrontation with John about his adultery while he was in
California, his rage and promise to beat her on his return, her claim
that she spent Friday night cowering in a locked spare room, her
call for help before returning home on the fifteenth, her confession
to the police after the shooting, and her assertion that John had
been lunging at her when she shot him.254 And an expert in forensic
pathology testified that the bullets that caused John's five gunshot
wounds "were each fired on the same downward angle." 5 A
neighbor testified that he saw Sylvia drinking coffee on her front
porch at 9:15 a.m. Saturday morning, rather than "cowering in fear
in the spare bedroom Saturday before she left to go shopping."256

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Day One of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

255. Id.
256. Id.
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On the second day of the trial, the prosecution called Rod
Englert, an expert at reconstructing crime scenes, who explained to
jurors "that the blood splatter indicated Flynn was fully sitting in
his chair, facing straight ahead with his hands at his sides when he
was struck" and that he had not been "rising out of the chair to beat
her" when the bullets hit.27 On cross, Englert did admit "that John

Flynn may have swiveled the chair to face the door prior to the
shots."2 8
According to a number of witnesses for the prosecution on the
second day of the trial, Sylvia was "an equal partner in an
admittedly horrible marriage." 9 Judith Flynn, the wife of one of
John's cousins, who claimed to have been friends with Sylvia for
over twenty years, testified that Sylvia and John 'were horrible to
each other,' hurling insults and profanities at each other even in
public."26 Sylvia, Judith reported, talked "openly about the couple's
sex life, his mistresses and her plan to kill him" and told Judith that
she had threatened "Chiecko with late night telephone calls and
even [told] Chiecko's son that his mother was a 'filthy whore." 26 '
Judith described a conversation she had had with Sylvia about a
month before the shooting: 2 "She told me that John had it in his
head that he was going to leave her for [mistress Linda Chiecko],
but that he wasn't. She said she'd see him dead first."2
Judith reported having "urged her friend to leave the marriage,
but she always demurred, saying she [Sylvia] would not be able to
give up her home and possessions."' Judith testified that although
she had often asked Sylvia whether John hit her, Sylvia "said no
every time but one."' That one time was in January of 1997, but
according to Judith, Sylvia "later admitted [that] he [John] had only
knocked a gun from her hand.., when she pointed it at him."266
Judith's son testified that Sylvia had bragged to him about "trying
to shoot her husband."2 7
Robin Panella, John Flynn's secretary, "also testified about that
1997 shooting."21 She described arriving for work "at the couple's
257. Day Two of Flynn Trial, supra note 184.
258. Id.
259. Id.

260. Id
261. Id.

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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home one morning, smelling gunpowder, and hearing John Flynn
say: '[tihis f***ing bitch tried to shoot me.'"" Two employees of the
prosecutor's office testified that several months after this incident,
"Flynn turned the gun into authorities and told them that his wife
had pulled the gun on him."27° This incident would have occurred
after Sylvia filed domestic violence charges against him in May of
1997. 271

The last part of the second day of the trial was rather dry, as
Paulhus "read aloud 70 pages of grand jury testimony in order to
Sylvia Flynn had offered different explanations of
show jurors that
72
the shooting."

On the third day of the trial, the prosecution called Linda
Chiecko - John's mistress and a slim, attractive, blond English
teacher with two Master's degrees who lived in Manhattan - to the
stand. Chieko described John Flynn, whom she met in a Manhattan
restaurant in February of 1997, as "'a total gentleman, beyond nice,
respectful, kind, and a good friend' and said that he was never
abusive." 73 Chieko reported that Sylvia had stalked, harassed, and
threatened her, often in vulgar language and after drinking. 4
When Linda asked John why Sylvia was doing this, he told her first
that "the woman was an ex-girlfriend who could not get over him"
and later that she had moved in with him "as a 'financial
arrangement' because he was short of cash."275 Linda said that she

and John were both afraid of Sylvia, and that she fled her home in
fear after John's death. 6 Linda did admit, on cross-examination
(after an initial denial) that she had left a profanity-laced message
on Sylvia Flynn's answering machine. Chiecko explained that she
was "'very irate' that Flynn had placed a harassing call to her adult
son, Michael."277 Apparently, Sylvia kept that tape; the defense read
of8
a transcript of a message in which "Chieko called Flynn a string 27
gutter.'"
the
in
'belongs
who
'loser'
vulgar names and said she is a
Chieko apologized in court for sinking to Sylvia's level: "I did get

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 205-12.
Id.
Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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down to 279
her level, and I'm sorry I did because that's not me
usually."

The prosecution called Valerie Brown next, the psychiatric
social worker' who met once with Sylvia in December of 1997,
when Sylvia appeared to explain why John would not be coming for
counseling (as he had agreed to do when the charges of domestic
violence against him were dropped)." Brown "testified that she did
not observe any signs of Battered Woman's Syndrome in Flynn
despite a lengthy discussion of the couple's troubled marriage."
According to Brown, Sylvia "was so embedded in the conflict of the
marriage that she really didn't want to get out."282 During cross,

"Brown said [Sylvia] Flynn did not seem to present the typical
'markers' of battered women's syndrome, which she described as
helplessness, hopelessness, isolation from family and friends and
financial dependence."=
The defense began its case on the third day of the trial, opening
with "two witnesses who knew Sylvia Flynn as a victim of violence":
a police officer and Sylvia's older brother.'
The jury heard the
testimony of the police officer who had taken Flynn's statement in
September of 1997 after the incident in which John had "slammed
her head through a wall, pushed her to the ground and beat her
with a shoe."'
Next was Leonard Lee Ashby, Sylvia's older brother, who
described their horrific childhood with a "violent disciplinarian" as
a father, a man who beat both Sylvia and himself (Leonard Lee
Ashby) with the buckle end of the belt until they were bruised and
bleeding and who also abused his wife.' Ashby described John
Flynn as "controlling and overbearing" and recounted that it "broke
his mother's heart that Flynn would never let his sister visit the
family at holidays." 7 On cross, "Ashby said that his knowledge
about the lack of holiday visits came only from his sister and not
from any discussions with John himself."'
279. Id.
280. Williams, supra note 212.
281. Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138; see supratext accompanying notes 210-16.
282. Id. Before ending the presentation of its case, the prosecution also called (as a hostile
witness) Marilyn Lago. When confronted "with an investigator's report that quoted her as
saying Flynn gave her a different account of the shooting than the one now being advanced
by the defense," Marily Lago stated that "the report was simply wrong." Id.
283. Williams, supra note 212.
284. Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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On the fourth day of the trial, the defense presented a number
of witnesses who portrayed Sylvia "as a good-hearted soul who
suffered mightily at the hands of a sadistic husband" in an effort to
rebut the prosecution's claim that she "cooked up tales of abuse
after she killed her husband" out ofjealousy.2 89 A number of people
testified to seeing bruises on Sylvia over the years.2 °
Lynne Ferraro (who called John Flynn "belligerent and
obnoxious and a womanizer," and described Sylvia's 1997 attempt
to leave and John's harassment of the person with whom she
stayed), the neighbor (who described him as "disrespectful,
derogatory, and insulting"), his sister (who called him "violent" and
"out of control"), and a former fishing pal and ex-police officer,
Leonard Belcaro (who called him "degrading and demoralizing")," 9
all testified,' as did six people who witnessed Sylvia with bruises
and black eyes over the years.293 In the lobby of the courthouse,
Leonard Belcaro assured reporters that Sylvia, who had "stayed
with his family for 'three weeks after the shooting' was not the
person the prosecution was making her out to be."294
Lynn Ferraro testified "that in the week before the shooting,
she felt tensions and the potential for violence were escalating. She
talked to Flynn again about getting a divorce, but she [Sylvia] told
her [Lynn] that her husband refused."' 5 According to Lynn's
testimony, "John told her he would never give her a divorce, that he
would kill her before he gave her anything."2' According to Lynn,
on Friday, August 14 (the day before John's death), "Sylvia was
convinced John Flynn was going to beat her when he returned from
a business trip." 7 Sylvia "told Ferraro that she planned to
barricade herself in a spare bedroom and had even prepared a
makeshift bathroom there."298
John Flynn's brother-in-law, Steven Hart - the man with
multiple sclerosis and a cane who was thrown against the wall of a
nursing home by John 21 - testified about that incident. The
prosecution "suggested [that] Hart 'set John Flynn up' by
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 165-70.
Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 154-61.
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surreptitiously tape recording the assault, " "°° though Steven Hart
explained that he was fearful about what might happen that day
with John, given his temper, and wore a tape recorder for selfprotection.3 ° ' In addition, Dorothy Hart described the relationship
between John and Sylvia as one in which John was always abusive
with Sylvia totally subservient and cringing when he spoke. 0 2
Dorothy and Steven Hart's son testified about being beaten by John
Flynn (along with his siblings) during the 1970s. 13
Also on day four, Sylvia's friend Phyllis Roberts testified about
the bruises and abuse she had seen, as described above.30 '
Afterwards, as she stood outside the courthouse, she said: "I was
petrified in there, but I just told the truth, and believe me, I could
When she saw Sylvia's
have said a lot more if they asked."'
picture in the newspaper the day after the shooting, she was sure
that she would read about the death of Sylvia at John's hands.3"
And John Belcaro, John's ex-fishing buddy, testified about John's
harassment of himself and of Sylvia at a dinner party at Belcaro's
house. 07
On the fifth day of the trial, criminalist Peter Deforest testified
the "blood stains and ballistics evidence do not contradict the
hairdresser's account of the 1998 shooting of her husband," though
he "stopped far short of endorsing Flynn's version of events, telling
jurors he could not determine exactly what happened. "s°c Although
the state's expert testified the blood splatter on the chair indicated
John Flynn had been seated when the shots were fired, Deforest
testified "that the stains do not address whether the victim was in
the chair at the time of the shooting. The victim could have been
slightly out of the chair and then fallen back into the chair before
the blood flow started."3 °' Deforest acknowledged, however, that
Flynn could not have been lunging for his wife's throat with his
hands out before him at the time of the shooting."1 0 And he also

300. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
301. Id.
302. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 177-84.
305. Day Four of Flynn Trial, supra note 161.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
309. Id.
310. According to the police, this was Sylvia's story when she was first interviewed. See
Case Background of Flynn Trial, supra note 148.
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"admitted that it was 'very obvious' Flynn was not looking at his
wife when she shot him."3 1
David Scearce, Sylvia's 38-year old son - a Navy operations
specialist - also testified on day five. David was expected to be a
key witness, but he testified for only a brief time and indicated
afterwards "both he and his mother were disappointed in the
testimony lawyers elicited. " " According to David: "I basically said
nothing."313 Outside the courtroom, he explained that he wished the
jury had heard "that he had seen his mother covered in bruises
throughout her relationship with John Flynn and that he had
interceded in a fight between the couple when he was 16." "' He
also would have liked to tell jurors that John Flynn "prevented him
from addressing his mother as 'Mom,' insisting that outside the
family he call her 'Sylvia."315 David did tell jurors about the two
times, described earlier, when he and his father tried to help Sylvia
escape from John Flynn in the 1970s.31 6
Other witnesses on day five testified to seeing John physically
and/or emotionally abuse Sylvia. For example, a next-door neighbor
testified: "I never seen anything good between them .

.

. he was

either yelling at her or talking to her like I would never talk to
3 17
anybody."

On day six, Sylvia Flynn decided not to take the stand. Mary
Ann Dutton, a well-known psychologist who has specialized in
problems of battered women and who teaches at George Washington
University, testified as an expert for the defense.3 8 Dutton had
interviewed Sylvia twice and "given her a battery of 10 psychological
tests."31 9 Dutton stated that in her opinion, Sylvia "was a battered
woman, and she had been exposed to chronic abuse that was quite
severe."32 According to Dutton: "[Sylvia] knew how to read John
Flynn, and she knew by looking and listening to him that day that
he meant to hurt her.... Sylvia Flynn had tried to leave and failed,
she'd tried to summon police and failed, and she felt as though she
311. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
317. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
318. Court TV Online, Flynn Turns Down Chance to Tell Her Side of the Story (Oct. 3,
2000), at http'J/courttv.com/trials/flynn/100300_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Day Six of Trial] (on file with author).
319. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
320. Id.
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had no options."32' Dutton used the word "'imminent' to describe the

type of threat Flynn felt." 22 Paulhus, the prosecutor, attempted to
undermine Dutton's credibility as an expert:
He seemed to suggest Dutton was an extremist when he called

jurors' attention to several papers on feminist topics written by
the psychologist. When he asked Dutton if she was "an advocate
for domestic violence victims," she looked puzzled and
responded, 3"I think domestic violence is wrong, if that's what
you mean." 1
On day five, the prosecution began calling "a series of rebuttal
witnesses who alleged that the 57-year-old Brick Township
hairdresser lied about key elements in her account of her life with
the man she says abused her for 28 years."' 2' Paulhus began with
a married couple from Ohio who vacationed with the Flynns for
three weeks said they never observed any signs of abuse. A former
hair client testified that the defendant once told her bruises on her
rib cage came from falling,off a motorcycle, not her husband's fists.
Flynn's former sister-in-law, who adopted the defendant's infant son
John Wesley Barker, III in 1965, said Flynn never made any effort
to see the child.' 2
Additional rebuttal witnesses appeared on day seven. Michael
C. Flynn, a son of John (but not of Sylvia) testified that his father
was "a good man and a devoted parent."126 He regarded "the fishing

trips he took with his father as 'some of the best memories of my
life.'" 27 He maintained that he never saw his father hit Sylvia, that
he and Sylvia had a good relationship, and that although the couple
often engaged in "profanity-laced arguments," they were "two
sided."328 On cross, he admitted that Sylvia had told him "she feared
his father," but added that "she seemed to be more concerned with
his girlfriend than being afraid of him." 29
Prosecutor Paulhus also called a former waitress at Duncan
Donuts "who testified Sylvia Flynn was a regular at her breakfast
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Williams, supra note 141.
Day Six of Trial, supra note 318.

326. Court TV Online, FinalTestimony PaintsJohn Flynn as a Victim, not anAbuser (Oct.
4, 2000), at http://courttv.comL/trialsflynn/100400-ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Day Seven of Trial] (on file with author).
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counter and had a close and possibly romantic relationship with
another man," George Warner. 33 0 According to this witness, who
was also Warner's housekeeper, Warner kept in his home "an 11-by14 inch 'glamour shot" of Sylvia in a feather boa. 3 ' She also
reported that "Warner bought Flynn an expensive necklace which
she wore every morning only during breakfast."3 2
In order "[to suggest that Flynn often exaggerated events to
paint herself as a victim, the prosecutor called a police officer who
investigated a car accident Flynn was involved in four months after
the shooting."333 Although Sylvia "told a newspaper that her car
was engulfed in flames," the officer testified his "vehicle was only
'grazed' in the chain-reaction accident, and was 150 feet from the
cars actually burning."'
Karen Keating, another rebuttal witness, testified that Sylvia
had told her that her son, John Wesley Barker III, had died as a
result of the car accident that killed his father.335 In reality, as
noted earlier, Sylvia gave her son to her husband's sister, who
adopted him.336
At some point in the trial, Paulhus, the prosecutor, said that
Sylvia had tried to kill John before August 15. 37 On January 3,
1997, Sylvia shot a gun at John, but it misfired. 8 According to
Paulhus, she tried to kill him because he spent New Year's Eve
without her at a party in Manhattan.339 Sylvia had "given
conflicting accounts of that shooting, saying either she fired to scare
him or she fired to get him off her because he was suffocating
her."34
Finally, the prosecution called its last rebuttal witness, Dr.
Azariah Eshkenazi, a psychiatrist who had interviewed Sylvia
twice, to rebut the testimony of Mary Ann Dutton, Sylvia's expert on
battered women. Eshkenazi "said any mental problems she has now
are the result of shooting her husband and were not present when
she fired the gun."3 4 ' Eshkenazi testified that
330. Id. It was George Warner who urged Sylvia to call the police for an escort rather than
going home alone on August 15. See supra text accompanying notes 229-30.
331. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Williams, supra note 141.
336. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
337. Williams, supra note 141.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
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[a] battered woman ... all her life has depended on her father,
mother or husband; she has little education, is unable to support
herself and is totally dependent, emotionally and financially, on
her husband.... She cannot walk away from him because she
is totally dependent on her husband for total survival. 42
Since Sylvia had her own beauty shop and friends, she was not a
battered woman.3
Pointing to her "five previous marriages," Eshkenazi also "said
she knew how to extricate herself from a relationship if
necessary."'" Eshkenazi noted "[hier fifth marriage was to a man
18 years her junior whom she married 'not for love but for money...'
It shows she knew how to survive."3' Eshkenazi's concluded: "We
don't see any of the symptoms [of a battered woman] here."3
Sylvia's lawyer, William J. Farley, suggested on cross-examination
that Eshkenazi "did not understand the syndrome," noting that
Eshkenazi had testified that "a woman who fights back against her
abuser or calls the police does not suffer from the syndrome" and
that "[s]uch views are at odds with Dutton's testimony."347 The
judge asked "Eshkenazi if a woman could be the victim of domestic
violence, but not a battered woman." 3 4 Eshkenazi responded: "If
the woman has the inner strength to walk out, . . . there is no
Battered Woman's Syndrome."3 49
Although many witnesses "testified that Flynn told them she
was abused, and that her husband was arrogant and unfaithful,"
Paulhus argued that these "friends don't know the real Sylvia
Flynn, one capable of planning and carrying out murder":=0
[These friends] didn't know, for example, that for 27 years, the
Flynns were not legally married or that Sylvia Flynn had
abandoned two children. She told her friends that one child had
died in a 1965 car accident. The other child was reared by his
father and lives in Virginia.351
342. Carol Gorga Williams, Flynn Slaying Case Goes to Jurors;Decision on Fateof Brick
Woman Could Come Today, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 5, 2000, at B1.

343. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
344. Id.
345.
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350.
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Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
Id.
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On day seven, the jury also heard closing arguments and began
deliberations.35 2 Closing argument for the plaintiff was given by her
attorney Farley:
Farley .

.

. told jurors that they would have to choose

between two conflicting portraits of Flynn. He urged the panel
not to see his client as a jealous murderer, as the state claims,
but as a sad woman whose life is marked by episodes of abuse.
In his 20 minute closing argument, Farley never mentioned
forensic evidence, but instead focused on what he called "a
pattern of fear and hope" in Flynn's life. He reminded jurors
that her brother and father had beaten her when she was a
child. She escaped, he said, only to encounter more violence at
the hands of other men.
He said John Flynn, who his client met in 1970, abused her
throughout their marriage. He cited four witnesses who
testified that they had seen bruises on [Sylvia's] body, and
reminded jurors that John Flynn's bullying was not confined to
his home. Flynn's brother-in-law, who suffers from multiple
sclerosis and walks with a cane, testified that Flynn once
attacked him as they argued over his elderly mother's care.
"John Flynn didn't know how to stand up to men. He knew
how to stand up to Sylvia and to men with multiple sclerosis,"
said Farley.
He recounted occasions stretching back to the 1970s when
Flynn left her husband only to return later.
Drawing on the words of the defense spousal abuse expert,
he said, "Fear drove her away, hope brought her back."
Farley ridiculed the state's jealousy motive, saying John
Flynn's affairs with other women filled his client with selfhatred and thoughts of suicide, but never vengeance.353
Paulhus gave the closing argument for the prosecution, arguing "the
violence was sporadic and not severe enough to cause Battered
354
Woman's Syndrome":
Prosecutor Michel Paulhus called Flynn's account of the
shooting "impossible, impossible, impossible."
He urged jurors to concentrate on the physical evidence,
which he said told the absolute truth of what happened that
night. John Flynn was turned away from the defendant when
she shot him, he argued. She was in no danger at all.
352. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
353. Id.
354. Verdict of Flynn Trial, supra note 220.
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He acknowledged that the victim was "no saint" and beat
his wife on occasion.
"John Flynn was a loudmouth, and he was ajerk," Paulhus
said.
But, he said, Flynn was never a battered woman. He said
she had options that truly battered women do not, and she was
exploiting their experience to free herself from a murder rap.
"It's an insult to the ones who truly are battered and live
like that and suffer," the prosecutor said.
Paulhus reminded jurors that when Flynn shot her
husband she was carrying a cell phone, her car keys and a gun.
If she genuinely feared for her life, he said, she could have used
her keys to get away or the phone to call police.
"Sylvia Flynn is not a battered woman. She's a woman
scorned, and that's why John Flynn is dead," Paulhus
concluded. 55
On the first full day of jury deliberations, the jury of five men
and seven women "sent two questions to Judge James N. Citta":
In the morning, they asked Citta to reread the part of his
charge outlining the elements of murder. Citta did, explaining
that Flynn acted "purposefully and knowingly" when she took
[John's] life.
In the afternoon, the jurors sent out a second note asking
the judge to repeat for a third time the elements of murder as
well as the elements for two lesser charges, aggravated
manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.
They also asked whether the phrase "purposefully and
knowingly" applied to the period before the incident or during
the incident.
The judge told them that since the state murder statute
does not require premeditation, "prior to the incident has
nothing to do with it."3'
Jury deliberations began all over again the next day when an
ill elderly woman on the jury was replaced by a younger woman."
Jurors spent most of that "afternoon listening to the testimony of

355. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
356. Court TV Online, Jury Still Pondering Sylvia Flynn's Fate (Oct. 5, 2000), at

http://courttv.con/trials/flynn/100500-_ctv.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Day
Eight of Trial] (on file with author).
357. Court TV Online, JurorReplaced by Alternate,DeliberationsStart Over (Oct. 6, 2000),
at httpJ/courttv.comtrials/flynn/100600-ctv.html (lastvisited Oct. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Day
Nine of Trial] (on file with author).
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three key witnesses that they requested be read back to them." 58
One of the three key witnesses was psychotherapist Valerie Brown
"who met with Sylvia Flynn once in 1997 and said that Flynn did
not suffer from Battered Woman's Syndrome.35 9 Jurors also asked
"for read-backs of the testimony of the medical examiner and the
state's crime scene reconstruction analyst."' s
The jury was given the choice of three possible guilty verdicts:
murder, requiring a finding that Sylvia "purposely or knowingly"
caused John's death, carrying a minimum sentence of thirty years
to life; aggravated manslaughter, requiring a finding that Sylvia
caused John's death "under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to human life," carrying a sentence of ten to thirty
years; and manslaughter, requiring a finding that Sylvia caused
John's death by actions "committed recklessly," and carrying a five
to fifteen year sentence." Alternatively, the jury could return a
3 62
verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense.
The jury convicted Sylvia Flynn of aggravated manslaughter
after deliberating "a little less than 10 hours."' According to the
prosecutor David Millard, the verdict "ma[del clear that the
battered women's syndrome was not applicable as a legal defense to
Mrs. Flynn's homicidal conduct."' In sentencing, the judge could
give anywhere from ten to thirty years, as indicated above, with a
presumption of twenty years.' Judge Citta sentenced her to the
maximum thirty years (the same as the minimum sentence for a
murder conviction), and did so under the state's "no early release
act;" Sylvia must therefore serve eighty-five percent of her term
(twenty-five years and six months) before becoming eligible for
parole.' At sentencing, the judge stated: "This is a person, who
even after being made aware of the potential consequences, chooses
to do what she chooses to do.... In this circumstance, she chose to
commit homicide." 7 Thus, Sylvia ended up with a sentence that,

358. Id.
359. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 211.15.
360. Day Nine of Trial, supra note 357.
361. Day Eight of Trial, supra note 356.
362. Day Nine of Trial, supra note 357.
363. Verdict of Trial, supra note 220.
364. Carol Gorga Williams, Flynn Verdict: Wife guilty of Manslaughter, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Oct. 11, 2000, at Al.
365. Id.
366. Id.; Carol Gorga Williams, Woman'Gets 30 Years in Slaying of Husband; She Tells
Judge There was no Choice; He Calls Killing Planned,ASBURY PARK PRESS, Oct. 5,2000, at
Al.
367. Id.
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at a minimum, was almost three times as long as the plea bargain
she had turned down prior to trial.3
VI. UNDERSTANDING SYLVIA'S STORY

We cannot know the truth of what happened that evening in
August when Sylvia entered the house and shot John. Sylvia, like
many (but not all) battered women, was physically abused as a child
and watched her father abuse her mother as well. Her first
marriage took place at fourteen, at her mother's urging (to get
Sylvia out of the house and away from her father). This first
marriage (as well as some or all of her subsequent marriages) was
likely also abusive.
There are several pieces of evidence that suggest Sylvia used
alcohol regularly to cope with her situation: her threats and
harassment of the mistress, Linda Chieko, often seem to have
occurred when she had been drinking, 3 9 and she may have been
drinking before returning home on Saturday, August 15.370 Many
battered women use alcohol or drugs to self-medicate as a coping
strategy.
The prosecutor argued that Sylvia's friends did not know the
"real" Sylvia, as evidenced by their not knowing that she had
"abandoned" two children (giving one child up for adoption while
telling friends that he was dead) or that she and John had not been
married for twenty-seven of the years they were together.3 7' And,
in questioning Eshkenazi, the prosecutor used the fact that she had
been married five times (once to a younger man with money) to elicit
testimony that she therefore knew how to take care of herself and
how to extricate herself from relationships. 372 All these "bad facts"
are, however, normal in the life of a woman who has suffered abuse
from childhood. It is not surprising that Sylvia had difficulty
maintaining stable and healthy relationships with men given her
background, including being married at fourteen to get away from
an abusive father. Given her parents failure to parent her, it is not
surprising that she was not able to parent her own children. Her
friends' ignorance of the truth about her children indicates only that
she was ashamed of her inability to parent, as almost any person
would be given these circumstances. That she and John were not
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

See Day Nine of Trial, supra note 357.
See supra text accompanying note 274.
See supra text accompanying note 233.
See supra text accompanying note 351.
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married for almost all of their time together is likely additional
evidence of John's abuse. If he was an abusive, controlling person,
then he is the one who did not want to marry. John doubtless used
the fact that they were not married for most of their time together
to hurt Sylvia, increasing her insecurity and vulnerability.
John's psychological abuse would have been very damaging to
a woman like Sylvia, fragile from her past experiences with abuse.
Recall his demeaning remarks about her grammar3 7' and the
combination ofhis public (and doubtless private) rejections ofher ("I
don't dance with cows")374 with his continuous infidelities (his
former secretary's estimation that in the two years she made travel
arrangements for John, he had about two dozen affairs.)3 75 John's
affairs were psychological abuse (and naturally, as discussed in
Section IV, evoked anger as well as jealousy).
Sylvia's tendency to exaggerate - for example, her inaccurate
description of the car accident376 - is entirely consistent with a
psyche that has been damaged by years of abuse, beginning in early
childhood. Sylvia may well have had an abnormal need for
sympathy and may not have been entirely in touch with reality in
her assessments of the world around her. These "bad facts" are,
again, part of the ordinary life of someone permanently scarred by
abuse. They do not tell us anything about whether John abused her
for years nor about Sylvia's state of mind at the time she shot him.
Sylvia's boyfriend - the man she met regularly at Dunkin
Donuts for breakfast 3 77 - is another all-too-normal "bad fact" and
irrelevant to what should have been the key issues in her trial.
Many battered women have a "boyfriend," i.e., a man they depend
on and with whom they have a relationship which is romantic on
some level. These are extremely vulnerable women in great need of
emotional support. The presence of such a friend does not, however,
indicate that John was not violent nor that she did not shoot him
out of reasonable fear for her own safety.
Sylvia said that she was barricaded in a bedroom when John
returned home from California during the early hours of Saturday,
August 15,378 and that she left in the morning to go shopping (and,
apparently, to get out of the house and away from him). 9 But a
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
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neighbor testified that she was drinking coffee on the porch in front
of the house before she left and did not appear to be terrified. 8
Sylvia herself did not testify, so we do not know her explanation for
her presence there that morning. But she did know John, and she
may reasonably have thought, based on past experiences, that after
a late return home from a cross-country flight she need not worry
about his getting up at 9:15 a.m.
Sylvia's fear about going home on August 15 seems quite
reasonable. She had tried to escape from John a number of times
over the years and had gotten a restraining order at least once.
Nothing had worked. When she tried to leave, John followed her
and either cajoled her into returning or threatened relatives or
friends supporting or harboring her."1 As she explained to the
dispatcher when she made the 911 call, she had nowhere to go.
Perhaps she could have gone to the motel for the night, but that
would only delay the inevitable. And she had great reason to be
afraid. She had criticized John for his infidelity and he would have
been furious at her for trying to control him. 8 2 That she started the
confrontation by complaining about his infidelity is in no way
inconsistent with her being a battered woman. Battered women
routinely, as discussed in Section IV, fight verbally and sometimes
even physically. 3 Indeed, it is difficult to understand why Sylvia
would have called the police before going home that Saturday unless
she was afraid for her safety. It does not seem likely that she
intended to kill John out of pure jealousy and then made the call to
the police, thinking they would refuse to escort her home (as they
did) and she would therefore be able to kill John with impunity.
It is more difficult to understand why Sylvia felt reassured
when the dispatcher told her that he had called John and that John
had said she should come home.3
It seems likely that the call
would only infuriate John (which it did).'
But perhaps, with no
real options she could see (and a couple of drinks?),38 she may have
been anxious to believe the dispatchers' assurances - and did until
she heard John say "You bitch, you called the police on me again."3 7
Sylvia's wavering recollection of precisely what John had been
doing when she shot him - as the prosecutor stressed, her story
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
See supra text accompanying notes 170-200.
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changing from a claim that John had been lunging at her throat to
a claim that he had been rising from his chair' - is consistent
with my own experiences with battered women, who often do not
have a clear recollection of what happened. Sometimes they
disassociate or snap at the time of killing and cannot remember it
happening at all. Battered women often see their abusers as allpowerful, and to Sylvia, John's action of rising from the chair while
yelling 'You bitch, you called the police on me again, " 3 9 may have
felt like he was lunging at her to choke her. She honestly may have
remembered him as lunging at her (though he never did) and may
have been convinced by her lawyer to change her story in light of
the physical evidence that he was not lunging.
Sylvia's description of what John said before she shot him
sounds like John - various witnesses report his use of "bitch" in
similar situations .39 She heard the tone of his voice, and she was
terrified: she had not only called him on his infidelity but had also
called the police.
The prosecution argued throughout the proceedings that
Sylvia's denial of John's repeated violence (to Valerie Brown, for
example), 3 1' her conflicting stories about incidents, and evidence
that she had tried to kill John before (out ofjealousy) 39 2 was used to
undermine her credibility. But battered women routinely and
normally deny or minimize the harm done to them. Indeed, a major
problem for prosecutors in criminal proceedings against batterers
is that in the vast majority of cases, the woman changes her story
and denies the abuse by the time there is a hearing on a permanent
order. 9 3 Most battered women do not leave an abusive partner the
first time abuse occurs. When they return to an abuser - hopeful
that the abuse is over - they inevitably deny or minimize the past
abuse, as Sylvia did in her conversations with Valerie Brown and
others.
Indeed, in our clemency cases, we found that women in prison
charged with killing their husbands (or hiring someone to do so) still
minimized the abuse. Often, the most horrific details would come
out in interviews with others and would then be confirmed by the
client. But the client would not herself bring up these details even
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
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when doing so could only help in the preparation of her clemency
petition. Sylvia's inconsistencies, while not unusual, were more
"bad facts" used against her at trial.
The testimony at trial that is actually inconsistent with Sylvia's
story is actually very limited: John's cousin Judith, who described
herself as Sylvia's friend, testified that Sylvia repeatedly said that
she would kill John before allowing him to leave her for Linda
Chiecko"9 and that Sylvia said she could not leave because she
could not give up her home and possessions;395 John's son. by an
earlier marriage testified that his father and Sylvia often had
"profanity-laced arguments," but the arguments were "two sided"
and John was not abusive;' several other witnesses testified that
Sylvia was "an equal partner in an admittedly horrible marriage";39
and a couple who had once vacationed with the Flynns for three
weeks testified that they saw no evidence of abuse.39
Relatives, including children, of an abusive man often deny the
abuse; this was true for several of our clemency clients even though
the evidence of abuse was incontrovertible. Judith and her son are
the only members of John's family to testify in support of the
prosecution rather than the defense. Judith may have hated Sylvia
for any number of reasons.3' We know nothing about the married
couple from Ohio that vacationed with John and Sylvia. Perhaps
that husband was abusive, and they testified as they did to bolster
denial of abuse in their own relationship. Although most of the
evidence supported Sylvia's story, the jury found her guilty of
aggravated manslaughter and the judge sentenced her to the
maximum sentence of thirty years, which was also the lowest
possible sentence for a murder conviction (though the jury acquitted
her on the murder charge)." In the next section, I explore the
factors that explain Sylvia's thirty-year sentence.
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ashamed to have a poorly-educated sister-in-law openly discussing John's sexual perversions.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 366-67.
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VII. SYLVIA'S PROBLEMS AT TRIAL

Sylvia, like most of the women we represented in the Illinois
Clemency Project, faced a number of problems, including"bad facts,"
outrageous arguments made by the prosecution to appeal to
stereotypes and cultural biases, and poor representation by defense
counsel. She faced an additional problem not faced by any of our
clemency clients but one likely to be a problem for other women who
kill their abusers in the future: the prosecution's use of "experts" on
battered women who believed stereotypes and knew nothing about
the reality of battered women's lives. I begin by discussing how the
prosecutor's arguments and experts appealed to cultural scripts and
cognitive biases. I then turn to the problems with the defense.
A. Cultural Scripts and Cognitive Biases
Battered women are not perfect. It is not good for the soul to
live in terror, to be called a bitch and worse on a routine basis, to be
demeaned and mistreated and tortured. As discussed earlier, most
battered women are angry and many are jealous."° They may have
been violent themselves, fighting back physically as well as
verbally.'
A person who lives in a culture (her home) where
violence and vulgar degrading language are routinely hurled at her
is likely to use violence and vulgar language as well. She is likely
to drink too much, or use drugs to numb herself. She may well have
past experiences with abuse and many personal difficulties, such as
multiple failed relationships and children raised by others.
1. "Badfacts" and prosecutorialarguments.
The combination of "bad facts" and the prosecutor's ability to
make just about any argument, no matter how prejudicial,
stereotypical, and nonsensical, is a major problem for many battered
women who do receive trials. Consider, for example, the following
arguments made by the prosecution in Sylvia's case:
The prosecutor took care to introduce evidence that prior to
the shooting, Sylvia denied that John abused her, or minimized

it, and gave inconsistent accounts, thus suggesting that her post-

401. See supra text accompanying notes 77-102.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
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shooting accounts of abuse were false, simply an excuse for
getting away with murder.4 °s
Throughout the proceedings, the prosecutor argued that
Sylvia was a woman scorned rather than a battered woman,4

and that
Sylvia shot John out ofjealousy and anger rather than
40 5
fear.

On the second day of the trial, the prosecutor presented a
number of witnesses to show that Sylvia was "an equal partner
in an admittedly horrible marriage."4° This evidence included
her use of vulgar language, her threats and harassment of Linda
Chieko, as well as Sylvia's 1997 attempt to shoot John. °7
The prosecutor argued that the witnesses who testified to
Sylvia's abuse at John's hands "[didn't] know the real Sylvia
Flynn, one capable of carrying out murder."40 8 To support this
argument, the prosecution pointed to the fact that her friends
did not know that she had "abandoned two children," one of
whom was given up for adoption (rather than, as Sylvia had told
her friends, dying in a car crash)."'
The prosecutor argued that Sylvia's story of the details of
the shooting changed over time (from him lunging at her ready
to choke her to his getting up - or starting to get up - from his

chair) and that she exaggerated her danger in the car accident,
both indicating that she was not credible. 1
Perhaps most dangerous was the prosecutor's argument
that Sylvia was not a battered woman. Prior to trial, the press
reported that the prosecutor argued that there was "no history
of abuse."'1 1 Although the prosecutor admitted at trial that John
was occasionally violent, he continued to maintain that Sylvia
was not a battered woman,4 12 but one trying to "rewrite history

because she is trying to get away with murder.""' According to
the prosecutor, "the violence was sporadic and not severe enough
t
403. See supra text accompanying notes 394-98.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 244-46.

405. See id.
406. See supra text accompanying note 259.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

notes 260-63.
note 350.
note 351.
notes 333-34.
note 245.
note 252.
note 253.
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to cause Battered Woman's Syndrome." 14 In his closing
argument, the prosecutor argued that Sylvia was not "a truly
battered woman," and that it would be "an insult to the ones
who truly are battered" to think of her as such.415 The argument
that Sylvia was not a battered woman was supported by the
evidence of Valerie Brown, the psychotherapist who met once
with Sylvia in December of 1997, and psychiatrist Azariah
Eshkenazi,
the expert witness for the prosecution on battered
416
women.

The prosecutor used a question to argue subtly to the jury
that Mary Ann Dutton's testimony was suspect. According to
the Court TV report, he "seemed to suggest [that] Dutton was an
extremist when he [the prosecutor] called jurors' attention to
several papers on feminist topics written by the psychologist
[Dutton]. 417

With the exception of the last point in the above list (that
Dutton's testimony was suspect because she was a feminist), all of
the prosecutor's arguments are framed in such a way as to reinforce
the fundamental attribution error, discussed earlier in Section III;
that is the human tendency to overestimate the extent to which
human behavior is the result of fundamental character traits rather
than a response to a particular situation. 18 With many, if not most
battered women, this will be easy to do because most have "bad
facts" in their backgrounds: they are not saints. Such arguments,
appealing to cultural biases against bad women as well, as the
cognitive bias of fundamental attribution error, are extremely
troubling in the context of battered women who have killed. Rules
for excluding evidence more harmful to the defendant than
probative, such as evidence of past crimes, seem entirely consistent
with the need to guard against this cognitive error.419 What kinds
of rules would help protect battered women from this bias?
Consider the following suggestions for cases involving battered

414. See supra text accompanying note 354.
415. See supra text accompanying note 355.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16, 341-49.
417. See supra text accompanying note 323.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
419. FED. R. EVID.403; id. 404 (providing that character evidence is generallyinadmissible,
though there are exceptions); id. 405 (providing that specific instances of prior conduct are
admissible in the limited circumstances in which "character or a trait of character of a person
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense"); see id. 405, advisory committee note

(discussing these rules).
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women who have killed or injured (or hired someone to kill or
injure) their abusers.
In both Sylvia's case and in the case of Janice, the Clemency
client whose trial was described earlier,420 the prosecution argued
that the allegations were made up after the shooting to try to get
away with murder. In addition, in Sylvia's case, the prosecutor
argued that she was "an equal partner in an admittedly horrible
marriage," despite overwhelming evidence that John had been
physically abusive (and Sylvia had not).42 ' Yet in both these cases,
the evidence had clearly established that the deceased had
physically and psychologically abused the defendant.
There is no such thing as "a typical battered woman" in any
technibal sense of the word.422 Women react differently to abuse,
and react differently to different levels of abuse, depending on their
In fact,
backgrounds, fragility, and other character traits.4
in
explicitly
speak
statutes
state
even
and
courts
some
although
Woman
terms of the admissibility of evidence on Battered
Syndrome,424 there is no such clinically diagnosable condition.425
There is only abuse followed by a variety of responses. 26 That a
woman fought back physically or verbally does not undermine the
claim of abuse.427
We therefore should allow defense counsel to request a pretrial
hearing on whether there is significant evidence of physical abuse
of the defendant by the deceased. If the judge finds there is such
evidence, the prosecution should not be able to argue that the
defendant is not a battered woman or that she was an equal partner
in a bad marriage.
Sylvia's prosecutor also argued that her claims of past abuse
were incredible because they were inconsistent with her own earlier
denials or attempts to minimize the abuse she suffered. Yet, as
discussed above, women routinely, normally, deny and minimize
abuse.'~ The prosecution also argued Sylvia was not credible
because she had given different stories at different times about
420. See supra text accompanying notes 121-30.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 259, 284-94.
422. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1197-1202 (1993).
423. Id. at 1216.
424. Mary Ann Dutton, THE IMPACT OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATrERINGAND ITS EFFECTS
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS INVOLVING BArIERED WOMEN 3-4 (1994), available at http://www.ojp
.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94/Guidesirrials/Impact/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2001).
425. Dutton, supra note 422, at 1197-1202.
426. Id.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 90-102.
428. See supra text accompanying notes 392-93.
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whether John was lunging for her or merely starting to rise from his
chair when she shot him. Battered women, however, often do not
have one clear, accurate, unchanging memory of what happened, as
discussed earlier. 42' These arguments makes sense only as appeals
to the cultural bias (based on cultural scripts) that women who
complain of male abuse are lying.430 We need a rule holding that the
fact that a woman has denied or minimized abuse in the past is
inadmissible to show that there was in fact no abuse. Moreover, if
the jury hears evidence that an abused woman's story about key
events has changed over time, they should also hear an instruction
explaining that although in general inconsistencies may suggest
someone is lying, inconsistencies in memory about the shooting are
normal for women who have killed abusers.43'
Sylvia's prosecutor argued that she was an angry, jealous
woman, not a battered woman. But, as we saw in Section IV, most
battered women are angry and those whose abusers integrated their
infidelity into their psychological abuse (as John did) are also
jealous. This is a false dichotomy. That Sylvia was angry and
jealous does not prove anything about whether she was afraid John
was going to kill or seriously injure her when she shot him. This
argument only makes sense as an appeal to stereotypes about
battered women as always and only passive, dependent, and afraid,
never feisty, angry, or jealous. We need a rule that would hold
inadmissible evidence that a woman was angry at or jealous of her
abuser for purposes of showing that she did not act out of fear at the
time she killed or injured her abuser (or hired someone to do so).
In both Sylvia's case and in the case of our Clemency client,
Janice, allegations about their inadequacies as mothers were used
to make them look bad. In Sylvia's case, the prosecutor claimed
that the fact that her friends did not know she had "abandoned" two
children indicated that they did not know her.432 In Janice's case,
the prosecutor argued that her four abortions showed her disdain
for human life.' The fact that Sylvia lied about something she was
ashamed of- failing to parent her sons adequately - simply does
not indicate that her friends did not know her. And the fact that
Janice had four abortions at her abuser's insistence (after he had
429. See supra text accompanying notes 376, 388-89.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 73-76. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics
and DomesticAbuse, 110 YALE L. J. 1459 (2001) (discussing cultural scripts in the context of

battered women).
431. For specific language, see infra Section VIII.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 350-5 1.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
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convinced her that now was not the time to get pregnant, with the
quite credible threat that otherwise he would perform the abortion
himself)434 shows nothing about how she felt about these
experiences.
Although not framed as such, arguments such as those of the
prosecutors in Janice's and Sylvia's cases are arguments based on
character, i.e., that bad mothers are bad women. Because Janice
and Sylvia were bad mothers, they did not act in self defense when
they killed their husbands. This argument appeals to a powerful
cultural script - good women are good mothers, and bad mothers
are bad women. But like other arguments based on character,
which are generally excluded by the rules of evidence, evidence that
women who have killed their abusers were also bad mothers is far
more prejudicial than probative.' We should adopt a rule excluding
evidence that a woman has been an inadequate mother in any case
in which she is on trial for murder (or hiring someone to murder) an
adult partner.
Thus far in this section, I have advocated restraints on the
ability of prosecutors to use "bad facts" when battered women are
prosecuted for killing or injuring (or hiring someone to kill or injure)
an abusive partner. In Section VIII, I summarize these changes and
suggest specific rules to address the problems.
There remain two troubling aspects of the prosecution in
Sylvia's case': (1) the testimony of Valerie Brown and Azariah
Eshkenazi, which was presented by the prosecutor to establish that
Sylvia Flynn was not a battered women47; and the prosecutor's
attempt (perhaps successful, given the outcome) to undermine Mary
Ann Dutton's credentials as an expert by suggesting that she held
extremist (feminist) views.4
2. "Experts"
The prosecution presented two witnesses who testified that
Sylvia Flynn was not a battered woman: Valerie Brown and Azariah
Eshkenazi. Both of these witnesses made statements in their
testimony that were false and extremely damaging to Sylvia.

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
See supra note 419 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 212-16, 340-49.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 323.
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Valerie Brown was a psychiatric social worker. 9 She did not
interview Sylvia after the shooting. She is the person who was
supposed to give counseling to John Flynn in December of 1997
following Sylvia's charge of domestic violence and obtainment of a
restraining order." Although Sylvia had the restraining order
rescinded a month later, the charges were dropped in exchange for
his agreeing to "get counseling.""' But it was Sylvia who showed up
for the counseling session in December of 1997, not John." 2 As
indicated earlier, Brown testified that Sylvia "said John Flynn had
hit her only once in the last two years," a version inconsistent with
that Sylvia "had given authorities in May" of that year." 3 Valerie
also testified that she gave Sylvia information about a shelter, but
According to
reported that Sylvia was not "terribly interested."'
Brown, Sylvia was "so imbedded in the conflict of the marriage that
she really didn't want to get out""5 and did not "present the typical
'markers' of battered woman's syndrome, which she [Brown]
described as helplessness, hopelessness, isolation from family and
friends and financial dependence."'0
Sylvia's showing up for John's counseling session is, however,
entirely consistent with his being a batterer. Batterers see their
partners as the problem, not themselves. And after an abused
woman has reconciled with her abuser - which happens routinely
after she has filed charges - abused women typically do deny or
minimize the abuse."' The fact that Sylvia showed up rather than
John suggests that he was "likely to have committed more severe
domestic violence and more likely to reoffend."' Men who either
drop out of treatment programs or fail to make an appointment are
often such men." 9
Even more troubling is Valerie Brown's assertion that Sylvia
was "so imbedded in the conflict of the marriage that she really
didn't want to get out"' 0 coupled with her insistence that Sylvia did
not "present the typical 'markers' of battered woman's syndrome,"
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Williams, supra note 212.
See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
Id.
Id.
Williams, supra note 212.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 393.
Edward W. Gondolf, Batterer Programs: What We Know and Need to Know, 12 J.

INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 83, 89 (1997).

449. Id.
450. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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which she described as "helplessne'ss, hopelessness, isolation from
family and friends and financial dependence." 5 ' That is the
problem for many battered women. Many remain - despite the
violence - deeply attached to their abusers and hope repeatedly
that the abuse has ended. That is why they stay.
Brown's testimony here is difficult to understand. What
precisely is her point? Is she saying that a woman who is
emotionally trapped in an abusive relationship is responsible for the
violence and should not be able to defend herself when in danger?
This seems like a deadly catch-22: if a battered woman is emotionally capable of leaving, then, of course, she should have left rather
than using force to defend herself. Even assuming that a woman
could have left, should that deprive her of the ability to defend
herself? 2 But if she is not emotionally capable of leaving, then she
is a woman who does not want to leave rather than a woman who
may have acted in self defense when she killed her abuser.
Brown's testimony indicated to the jury that only women who
are economically dependent on their abusers and isolated from
family and friends are really battered women. But battered women
are not a homogenous group. Not all battered women are
economically dependent on their abusers.' Nor are all battered
women totally isolated from family and friends. Indeed, some
abusers depend on their victims for economic support, and some
want their partners to have other interests.454 Most battered women
are far from helpless. As Gottman and Jacobsen report, many act
courageously to protect themselves and their children in the face of
danger. 5 And many - perhaps most - of those who have not yet

decided to leave are hopeful that the relationship will improve, and
their dreams will be fulfilled. 6 They remain imbedded in the
abusive relationship.
Finally, I wonder about the appropriateness of Valerie Brown's
testimony regarding whether Sylvia was a battered woman on the
basis of a single conversation when Sylvia was not there to talk
about herself or the problems in her relationship with John, but to
convince Brown that John, with whom Sylvia had reconciled, did not
need counseling. Sylvia was not Valerie's client, nor was she
451. See supra text accompanying note 216.
452. For an argument that we would look at battered women differently were we to take
relationships seriously, see Baker, supra note 430, at 1478-80.
453. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
454. Id.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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interviewed by Valerie as a client. It is true they had a discussion.
Could a discussion between an "expert" and a battered woman at a
laundromat (as they waited for their clothes to dry) be the basis for
testimony in court that the woman was not actually a battered
woman?
But the larger problem is that Valerie Brown was asked
questions to which she gave answers that were beyond her
knowledge. And she seems to have been regarded by the jury as a
reliable expert on battered women - the jury asked to have her
testimony read to them after they began deliberations (though not
the testimony of the either Dutton or Eshkenazi, the experts for the
defense and prosecution). Given her testimony, Brown had little if
any expertise in the area. Indeed, one wonders what qualifications
she had for her job as a counselor of abusive men.
Dr. Azariah Eshkenazi, the prosecutor's other expert on
battered women, was a psychiatrist from New York. He was hired
to rebut the testimony of Mary Ann Dutton, Sylvia's expert on
battered women. Eshkenazi, like Dutton, interviewed Sylvia twice.
Unlike Dutton, who administered a battery of ten psychological
tests to assess whether Sylvia "had been exposed to chronic abuse
that was quite severe," 4" Eshkenazi conducted no tests, 4 8 and
concluded that "any mental problems she has now are the result of
shooting her husband and were not present when she fired the
gun."" 9 Eshkenazi, like Brown, saw battered woman as all of a
type:
A battered woman... all her life has depended on her father,
mother or husband; she has little education, is unable to support
herself and is totally dependent, emotionally and financially, on
her husband. She cannot walk away from him because she is
totally dependent on her husband for total survival.460
Because Sylvia had her own beauty shop and friends, she was not
a battered woman."' Eshkenazi also pointed to her "five previous
marriages" as evidence that "she knew how to extricate herself from
a relationship if necessary."' 2 Eshkenazi noted her fifth marriage
was to a man 18 years her junior whom she married "not for love

457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

See supra text accompanying note 320.
See supra text accompanying notes 341-49.
See supra text accompanying note 341.
Williams, supra note 342.
Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.

462. Id.
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but for money.... It shows she knew how to survive."'

Eshkenazi,

like Brown, testified: "We don't see any of the symptoms [of a
battered woman] here."'
Sylvia's lawyer, Farley, did suggest on
cross that Eshkenazi "did not understand the syndrome," noting
that Eshkenazi had testified that "a woman who fights back against
her abuser or calls the police does not suffer from the syndrome"
and that "[sluch views are at odds with Dutton's testimony."4 s The
judge asked "Eshkenazi if a woman could be the victim of domestic
violence, but not a battered woman." 6 Eshkenazi responded: "If
the woman has the inner strength to walk out, there is no Battered
Woman's Syndrome.
Eshkenazi's testimony is as troubling as Valerie Brown's.
Given Sylvia's abuse by her father and her marriage at fourteen to
get away from him,' it seems most unlikely that "any mental
problems she has now are the result of shooting her husband and
were not present when she fired the gun." 9 Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine how a psychiatrist could know from interviewing someone
twice that any existing problems were related to one specific event.
The inaccuracy of Eshkenazi's narrow definition of battered
women has already been discussed above in critiquing Brown's
testimony. Like Brown's, Eshkenazi's narrow definition is not only
inconsistent with what we know empirically about battered women,
it is also, again like Brown's, consistent with stereotypes of battered
women, suggesting that neither of them have any expertise at all.
His testimony, as well as that of Brown, is consistent with the
cognitive biases which tend to accompany the categorization of
people into groups, as discussed in Section 111.470
Eshkenazi makes two other outrageous statements in the
testimony quoted above. He regarded Sylvia's "five previous marriages" as evidence that "she knew how to extricate herself from a
relationship if necessary." 471 And, he pointed out that "her fifth
marriage was to a man 18 years her junior whom she married 'not
for love but for money.' It shows she knew how to survive." 72 But,
the fact that Sylvia had gone through five divorces can hardly
463. Williams, supra note 342.

464. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.

468. See supra text accompanying note 139.
469. See supra text accompanying note 341.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 29-48.
471. Day Seven of Trial, supra note 326.
472. Williams, supra note 342.
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indicate she knew how to extricate herself from any and all relationships, no matter how dangerous or violent, and regardless of how
strong the emotional bond. Relationships are not fungible goods,
with each in a person's life - whether at fourteen or fifty-seven equivalent to every other. Nor can the fact that she obviously knew
how to survive until fifty-seven prove anything about whether, after
twenty-eight years of involvement with John Flynn and
psychological as well as physical abuse throughout that period, she
could escape from him.
Dr. Azariah Eshkenazi appears to be a well-known expert
witness -

indeed, a professional expert witness - in all kinds of

litigation in the New York area. "7 In light of his testimony, it
473. See, e.g., Natl Ass'n State Jury Verdict Publishers, Expert Witness Directory,
availableat http//vww.juryverdicts.con/experts/esl.html (last visited July 19,2001) (listing
Dr. Azariah Eshkenazi as expert psychiatrist). For cases he has testified in, see, for example,
Louis F. Albanese, Rel. No. 34-39280 (S.E.C. Oct. 27, 1997) (opinion), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/3439280.txt (last visited July 19, 2001) (in employee
challenge to disciplinary action by employer New York Stock Exchange, Eshkenazi testified
for the employer regarding employee's ability to participate in an on-the-record interview; if
employee had panic attack, there could be a short break in testimony); Human Res. Admin.
v. Farber, OATH Index No. 1664/00 (Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
oath/html/dec/00-1664.html (last visited July 19,2001) (in disability action in which employee
seeks to return to work, Eshkenazi testified for the employer that the employee was not
sufficiently recovered from migraine headaches to return to work); Dep't of Fin. v. Serra,
OATH Index No. 583/01 (Nov. 14, 2000), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/oath/
htmlldec/01-583.html (last visited July 19, 2001) (in disability action brought by employer,
Eshkenazi was hired to evaluate employee); Dep't of Parks & Rec. v. O'Connell, OATH Index
No. 1769/97 (Oct. 14,1997), availableat http:/www~nyc.gov/html/oath/html/dec/97-1769.html
(last visited July 19, 2001) (in disability case brought by employer, Eshkenazi testified that
employee lacked ability to return to work because of antipsychotic drugs usage); John
Cichowski, Vreeland Depicted as Rational Killer; Doctor Says Drugs Sharpened His Mind,
RECORD, Dec. 16, 1999, at Li (Eshkenazi testifies for the prosecution in a murder case in
which the defense presented an expert who testified that an overdose of barbiturates had
impaired the defendant's ability to understand what he was doing when he shot two pizza
delivery men; according to Eshkenazi, the drugs would only have alleviated the defendant's
pain and helped him "focus on what he was doing"); Timothy Clifford, PsychiatristSees Joel
Steinbergfor Prosecution,NEWSDAY, Jan. 12, 1989, at 6 (reporting that Eshkenazi evaluated
Joel Steinberg for the prosecution after the death of Lisa, aged six, from massive brain injury);
Failureto Help Prevent Wife's DeportationIs FactorAgainstFatherGetting Custody, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 8, 2000, at 21 (Eshkenazi testifies as Court-appointed mental health expert in custody
case); Finding of No Disabilityfor ChronicFatigue Is Not Supported by Medical Record, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 27, 1999, at 25 (in a disability case, Eshkenazi testifies as to the plaintiffs mental
status; not clear whether Eshkenazi was plaintiff or defendant's expert); William K. Heine,
Monmouth Caption, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 22, 1995, § B," at 1 (lawyer argues that
defendant, supposedly a battered woman who had killed her abuser, did not have effective'
assistance of counsel; in support, lawyer notes that Eshkenazi had examined the defendant
prior to trial "and had 'insight into her personality disorder that would have assisted in her
defense); Colleen Mancino, Doctor Disputes Mental Illness; Contends Jeffrey Not
Schizophrenic,RECORD, Dec. 8,1995, at NO1 (in trial of murder, defendant Eshkenazi testified
for prosecution that the defendant was not a schizophrenic and did not operate "under a haze
of mental confusion"); Penal Law Reduction of Murder Conviction, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 1992,
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seems unlikely that he has any significant training or experience in
domestic violence issues. He is clearly unfamiliar with the
literature in the area.
The problem of experts who may have some psychiatric or
psychological expertise but who know nothing beyond stereotypes
about battered women is likely to be an increasingly serious one in
the future. Every court that has considered whether the prosecution can examine such an expert in a case in which the defendant is
introducing an expert on battered women has concluded that it
may. 74 In future prosecutions of battered women, prosecutors are
increasingly likely to call their own experts, and have every
incentive to call someone with some training in psychiatry or
psychology but without any real knowledge about domestic violence
and its effects.
When juries hear two hired guns who testify as experts, one
hired by each side, they may disregard both or believe the one they
find more likeable. 5 Or jurors may tend to believe the expert
at 21 (in trial of a man for killing his wife, Eshkenazi testified for the prosecution that the
defendant was not a schizophrenic); Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Testimony Is Not
Precludedby Court in JonesAct Suit, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 21 (Eshkenazi was an expert
witness for the plaintiff in a maritime case involving a the plaintiff's injury at work); Retarded
Woman Won't Stand Trial in Child's Death, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 5, 1994, at 6
(Eshkenazi evaluated the defendant, about to be tried for the death a child for whom she was
baby sitting, and testified that she was incompetent to stand trial since she had the mental
ability of a seven year old and an IQ between 40 and 50); Upward DepartureApplication Is
Granted; Court Cites Dangerous Weapons, Risk of Death, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 28, 2001, at 17
(Eshkenazi gave defendant, convicted of illegal possession of firearms, a psychiatric
examination prior to sentencing); Carol Gorga Williams, Murder Trialhas Experts Battling,
ASBURY PARK PRESS, Sept. 18, 1997, § B, at 1 (in trial of man for murdering his girl friend,
Eshkenazi testified for the defense that defendant suffered from obsessive-compulsive
disorder and that the defendant had been upset).
474. See, e.g., Florida v. Hickson, 630 So.2d 172 (1993) (holding that defendant on trial for
killing her abuser must submit to evaluation by adverse expert when she intends to present
expert testimony on battered-spouse syndrome); Kansas v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (1988) (in
appeal on another issue, court refers to state's expert on battered women); Montana v. Hess,
828 P.2d 382 (1992) (holding that state has the right to have its expert(s) evaluate battered
woman on trial for murdering abuser when she is presenting expert on battered woman
syndrome); New Hampshire v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (1988) (holding that state has the right
to an adverse expert on battered woman syndrome); Bechtel v. Oklahoma, 840 P.2d 1 (1992)
(remanding for a new trial where defendant will be able to present an expert on battered
woman syndrome, but noting the State also can present an expert on this issue); Ortiz v.
Texas, 834 S.W.2d 343 (1992) (at punishment phase, state's expert testified that the
defendant was not a battered woman); New York v. Rossakis, 605 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 1993) (holding that battered woman on trial for killing her abuser must submit to
examination by the State's expert).
475. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers' Expertiseto Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts
about Trial Court Analysis of the PrejudicialEffects of Admitting and Excluding Expert
Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 619, 641(1984); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years
in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAW & Hm. BEHAV. 241, 253 (1986); see also SAUL M.
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whose testimony is most consistent with their own beliefs. Thus,
allowing a Brown or an Eshkenazi to testify will often be
tantamount to conducting Sylvia's defense without the testimony of
Dutton. Indeed, in Sylvia's case, after deliberations began, the jury
asked to hear, not the evidence of either Dutton or Eshkenazi, both
of whom had conducted clinical interviews of Sylvia, but only the
evidence of Valerie Brown, who never conducted a clinical interview
of Sylvia.
Of the three witnesses who testified about whether Sylvia was
or was not a battered woman, only one - Dutton, who testified for
Sylvia - seems to have any actual expertise in the area. Dutton is
a Professional Lecturer of Law at the National Law Center of
George Washington University and has written extensively about
battered women and their experiences.4 76 Yet, for that very reason,
the prosecutor suggested that she was an extremist who had written
"feminist" articles on the subject. 77
In both Sylvia's trial and our Clemency client Janice, the
prosecution used the word "feminist" to undermine the defense,
though it is mostly feminists, men as well as women, who are
knowledgeable about domestic violence. I suggest, therefore, a rule
forbidding the use of the word "feminist" by prosecutors to
KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTsMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 85-86 (1988) (discussing possible effects of expert testimony on the reliability
of eyewitness accounts, noting that conflicting evidence from hired experts may reflect "little
more than experts' willingness to say almost anything for the right price," and that duels
between experts can "deteriorate] into a popularity contest," leaving the jury confused and
misinformed).
476. See Lauren Bennett et al., Risk Assessment Among Batterers Arrested for Domestic
Assault: The Salience of Psychological Abuse, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1190 (2000);
Lauren Bennett et al., Systemic Obstaclesto the CriminalProsecutionof a BatteringPartner:
A Victim Perspective, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 761 (1999); Mary Ann Dutton,
MultidimendsionalAssessment of Woman Battering:Commentaryon Smith, Smith, andEarp,
23 PSCYHOL. WOMEN Q. 195 (1999); Mary Ann Dutton, UnderstandingWomen's Responses to
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191
(1993); Lisa A. Goodman et al., Episodically Homeless Women with Serious Mental Illness:
Prevalence of Physical and Sexual Assault, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 468 (1995); Lisa A.
Goodman et al., Predicting Repeat Abuse Among Arrested Batterers: Use of the Danger
Assessment Scale in the CriminalJustice System, 15 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 63 (2000);
Philanda Smith Hutchings & Mary Ann Dutton, Sexual Assault History in a Community
Mental Health CenterClinicalPopulation,29 COMMUNITY MENTALHEALTH J. 59 (1993); Mary
Ann Dutton, Sexuality in Close Relationships by Kathleen McKinnney and Susan Sprecher,
26 SEX ROLES 533 (1992) (book review); Mary Ann Dutton, Impact of Evidence Concerning
Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Trials Involving Battered Women (1994), availableat
httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/rrials/Impact/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2001); Malcom
Gordon, Validity of"Battered Woman Syndrome"in CriminalCasesInvolving Battered Women
(1994), availableat httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ocpa/94Guides/Trials/Valid (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
477. See supra text accompanying note 323.
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undermine the credibility of the defendant's expert, counsel, or any
other person, in cases involving battered women who have killed.
In addition, as we enter an era in which it is increasingly likely
that in battered women's defense cases, the prosecution as well as
the defense will call an expert to testify on battered women, it is of
critical importance that standards be developed that require real
expertise in the area. Indeed, such standards are necessary to
handle the testimony of those who, like Valerie Brown, work in the
domestic violence response system yet know little about the effects
of domestic violence. It cannot be assumed that everyone with some
psychiatric or psychological training is qualified to testify about the
experiences of battered women.
Jurisdictions vary with respect to the precise standard for when
a witness can testify as an expert on an issue such as the effects of
domestic violence, but most are similar to the federal standard. 478
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness can qualify "as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." 479 A
great deal of discretion is vested in the trial court in determining
whether a specific person is qualified as an expert on a particular
issue, but appellate review is available for abuse of discretion. 4 0 At
both the federal and the state level, however, the decisions applying
this standard - tend to be ad hoc and difficult to reconcile.4 1
Two changes are possible responses to the problem of experts
who know nothing. One would be to allow only the defense, not the
prosecution, to introduce expert testimony on Battered Woman
Syndrome or the experiences of battered women. 2 The defense
needs to introduce such testimony to counter the biases, stereotypes,
and cultural scripts of the judge and jury, who are likely to believe
that all battered women are passive and wholly dependent on their
478. JANE CAMPBELL MORARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS §2:6 (2001).
479. FED. R. EviD. 702 (giving language of 702 as amended in December of 2001). The
December 2001 amendment to 702 did not change the language quoted in text. See MORIARTY,

supra note 478, at § 2:3.
480. MORIARTY, supra note 478, at § 2:4.
481. Id. at §§ 2:5,2.6; see also People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920 (Colo. 1982) (allowing police
officer to testify on psychological state of victim during her testimony). Compare United States
v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirming trial court's decision to allow physician
to testify on psychological issues), with United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1001 (1983) (allowing osteopath without board certification in
psychiatry to testify on psychiatric issue while disallowing defendant's proffered expert, a
counselor at a Veteran's Center who would have testified about posttraumatic stress disorder,
even though many Vietnam veterans suffer from that condition).
482. For an article describing the differences between an expert on battered women's
syndrome and one on battered women's experiences, see Dutton, supra note 422.
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abusers, that women who complain about male abuse are likely
lying, and that if the abuse had been as bad as she now claims, she
would have left long ago. The prosecution has no similar need.
Instead, stereotypes, biases, and cultural scripts automatically and
unfairly skew deliberations in favor of the prosecution when a
battered woman is on trial.' One solution - the solution I propose
is to allow only the battered woman (when she is the defendant
in a prosecution for murder or attempted murder of her abuser) to
present an expert on battered women's syndrome or experiences.
That expert should, of course, be someone with real expertise.
This approach is likely to be rejected because courts have
generally given the prosecution in criminal cases rights parallel to
those of the defendant regardless of whether there is a parallel need
for such rights.' As a far less satisfactory alternative, I therefore
propose that the prosecution be allowed to present an expert on
battered women when the defendant presents such a witness, but
the state's expert must be (like the defendant's) someone truly
qualified, with real knowledge and experience in the field.
Thus far in this section I have discussed Sylvia's problems at
trial as a result of the prosecution's arguments and experts. I now
turn to the problems caused by her own lawyer.
B. Defense Counsel
Sylvia's lawyer was certainly part of her problem. Although he
recognized the need for an expert on battered women and obtained
the assistance of Mary Ann Dutton,' someone with real expertise
in the area, he seems to have blundered a number of times.
Sylvia's lawyer may have erred in presenting John as only a
monster without showing any positive aspects to their relationship.'
Such a presentation can undermine a battered woman's
defense, since the jury is unable to understand why she stayed.
During a pre trial hearing in December of 1999, the judge gave
Farley "a tongue-lashing... for turning over evidence to the prime-

483. This is, of course, not necessarily true for all prosecutions. See, e.g., State v. Griffin,
564 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1997) (allowing prosecution to call expert on battered women as part
of its case-in-chief in a rape prosecution).
484. Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State's Right to a Fair Trial,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1987) (arguing that courts unthinkingly give the state rights that are
parallel to those of the accused even when inappropriate).
485. See supra text accompanying notes 318-21.
486. Indeed, one of John's relatives testified that John was a "monster." See supra text
accompanying notes 163-64.

20011

THE PASSIONS OF BATTERED WOMEN

time television show '20/20."' v Farley had given "20/20" "a cassette
copy of the 911 call Sylvia Flynn made to Brick police before
shooting her husband" and "a recording of an interview with Steven
Hart, John Flynn's brother-in-law."'
On the third day of the trial, the judge "dressed down Flynn's
attorney, William J. Farley, Jr., several times for being unprepared
for witnesses and ignorant about court procedure."" 9 Before
"storming off the bench for an unscheduled recess," the judge
snapped: "I have an evidence book if you'd like to borrow it, Mr.
Farley."4
On the fifth day of the trial, the judge
[Llearned that over the weekend Farley had shown a videotape
of the testimony of the prosecution's ballistic expert to Deforest
in direct violation of the judge's sequestration order on
witnesses. 'What am I supposed to do now?' [the judge] shouted.
In the end, the judge prohibited Farley from engaging [Sylvia's]
expert [Deforest] in a'critique' of the state expert Rod Englert.491
Deforest was "a well-known forensic expert who worked for Los
Angeles prosecutors during the O.J. Simpson trial" and had been
"called primarily to undermine Englert's contention that John Flynn
was seated and facing away from his wife when shot."'
Perhaps this tongue-lashing from the judge contributed to
Farley's failure to elicit much evidence from the next witness, David
493
Scearce, Sylvia's son, who felt that he "basically said nothing,"
though he could have said more about John Flynn's abuse of his
mother. Even Court TV commented on the inadequacy of the direct
examination of David, noting that questions about Farley's handling
of the case continued to arise.494
As indicated earlier, for most of the Clemency Project's clients,
the major problem was their defense counsel. Sylvia Flynn's
lawyer's shortcomings, including his failure to elicit valuable
evidence from David Scearce4 95 and showing Sylvia's expert on crime

487. Andrew Gannon, Lawyer Rebuked for Giving "20/20' Show Audiotape, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, Dec. 17, 1999, at B2.
488. Id.
489. Day Three of Flynn Trial, supra note 138.
490. Id.
491. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
492. Id.
493. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
494. Day Five of Flynn Trial, supra note 142.
495. See supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text.
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scenes a tape of the prosecution's expert,"9 may well have
contributed to her thirty-year sentence.
This exemplifies another set of problems in an adversarial
system in which decisions, such as the verdict of the jury and the
sentence of the judge, can be influenced by countless emotional
factors having nothing to do with the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Judge Citta explained his harsh sentence (the harshest permitted
given the jury verdict) in the following words: 'This is a person, who
even after being made aware of the potential consequences, chooses
to do what she chooses to do.... In this circumstance, she chose to
commit homicide."4 9 v
The judge appears to have believed (1) that Sylvia was not a
truly battered woman; and (2) that Sylvia had boasted to Judith
(John's cousin) that she could kill John because of his affair and
"beat a conviction."49 s On the first point, recall that the judge asked
"Eshkenazi if a woman could be the victim of domestic violence, but
not a battered woman."49 9 And Eshkenazi responded: "If the woman
has the inner strength to walk out,...there is no Battered Woman's
Syndrome."5" The implication is that Sylvia had the inner strength
to walk out and therefore did not have Battered Woman' Syndrome.
Perhaps this exchange helps us understand the judge's
explanation of Sylvia's sentence. Had the only experts been people
who, like Mary Ann Dutton, really knew something about abusive
men and their victims, perhaps Sylvia would have had a better
chance of a fair trial, i.e., one in which emotional biases on the part
of decision makers were kept to a minimum. In the next section, I
summarize the changes I have suggested at various points in this
section, including the suggestion that experts on battered women be
people with some knowledge in the area.

VIII. SUMMARY OF REFORMS
In order to minimize the effect of emotional biases unfairly
prejudicing the trials of battered women who have killed or injured
their abusers, I suggest changes in a number of areas.
A pre-trial hearing should be held before a judge to determine
whether there is significant evidence of physical abuse of the
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text
See supra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note 491.
notes 366-67.
note 247.
note 348.
note 349.
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defendant at the hands of the deceased. If there is such
evidence, the prosecutor should not be allowed to argue that the
defendant is not a battered woman or that she was an equal
partner in a bad situation.
The fact that a woman denied or minimized the abuse in the
past should be inadmissible to show that there was in fact no
abuse in the past.
The fact that a woman was angry at or jealous of her abuser
should be inadmissible to show that she was not acting out of
fear at the time she killed or injured (or hired someone to kill or
injure) her abuser.
A woman's inadequacies as a mother or unwillingness or
inability to mother should be inadmissible in her prosecution for
murder or attempted murder of (or hiring someone to kill) an
adult partner.
In the prosecution of a battered woman who has killed her
abuser, if the prosecution argues that the defendant is not
credible because her story of what happened at the time of the
killing has changed overtime, the jury should hear the following
instruction:
The fact that the defendant's story about the key events had
varied over time may indicate, as the prosecution suggests, that
she is lying. But in assessing this evidence, keep in mind that
batteredwomen often change their storiesabout such events over
time becauseofpsychologicalproblemspreventingclearrecallor
the need to deny or minimize abuse.
Prosecutors should not be able to use the word "feminist" to
undermine the credibility of a woman's claim to be a battered
woman in a criminal trial or to undermine the credibility of any
expert or witness.
In order to qualify as an expert on battered women's
syndrome or experiences, it should be necessary that the witness
be familiar with the literature on domestic violence and its
effects on victims as well as with the literature on abusers and
their characteristics.50 1
501. For a similar suggestion in the context of psychological experts testifying on the
reliability of eyewitness' accounts, see KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, surpa note 475, at 86.

[C]ourts should set more stringent standards when it comes to qualifying as an
expert. According to the rules, an individual is qualified "by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education." In current practice, that standard is rather
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When there has been a showing of significant evidence of
physical abuse of the defendant at the hands of the deceased (at
the pre-trial hearing described above), the defendant - but not
the prosecution - should be allowed to introduce an expert to
testify on battered women's syndrome or experiences.
As noted earlier, courts have tended to give prosecutors the
same rights as those accorded defendants (no matter how
inappropriate). 2 It is therefore most unlikely that this last
suggestion will be adopted. As an inferior alternative, I therefore
propose the following rule:
In a prosecution of an allegedly abused woman for murder of her
alleged abuser, the prosecution has the right to have a qualified
expert examine the defendant and testify about battered women
if the defendant presents such an expert.
The changes suggested here have a much broader focus than
the issues which have dominated the legal literature on fair trials
for battered women who kill. Since expert evidence on battered
women has been admissible, the legal literature has tended to
address two issues: (1) the appropriate content of the expert witness
testimony for the defense (e.g., should the expert testify on "battered
women's syndrome" or "battered women's experiences")5 3 and (2)

loosely applied. Just as not all physicians are qualified to perform surgery, not
all psychologists are experts on the topic of eyewitness testimony. At the very
least, courts should demand that their experts be "actively engaged" through
teaching, writing, or research.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
502. See supra note 484 and accompanying text.
503. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill
Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV.WOMEN's L. J. 121 (1985) (noting that some experts have given
courts the impression that all battered women are alike); Dutton, supra note 422, at 11971202 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describingand Changing:Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986)
(considering whether the syndrome approach may be biased in favor of middle- and upperincome white women); Evan Stark, Re-PresentingWoman Battering: From Battered Woman
Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REv. 973 (1995) (arguing that experts should testify
on the batterer's pattern of coercive control rather than battered woman syndrome or post
traumatic stress disorder). Empirical studies suggest that it may make little difference
whether the expert speaks of battered women's syndrome or experiences. See Regina A.
Schuller & Patricia Hastings, Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact ofAlternative
Forms of Expert Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1996) (finding that mock jurors
.rendered more lenient verdicts and provided more favorable evaluations of the defendant's
claim of self defense in the presence [of either form] of expert testimony" for the defendant
than when there was no such expert).
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whether the immanence requirement of self defense should be
expanded.5
I have argued that the problems battered women face are far
broader. Many have to do with cognitive biases and cultural scripts
which make battered women's stories seem unlikely or incredible,
as discussed earlier. I My suggestions grow out of very limited
experience: familiarity with the cases of a number of battered
women who have killed as a result of my work for clients of the
Illinois Clemency Project for Battered Women and reading in the
area. I am not an expert on any aspect of criminal law and have no
I hope to provoke a broader discussion,
trial experience.
particularly with those who have more expertise, on what sorts of
changes might give battered women who kill a better chance of a
fair trial.
IX. CONCLUSION

As illustrated by Judge Posner's contribution to Bandes'
collection of essays, The Passions of Law, there are a number of
reasons why decision-makers in the legal system are likely to have
difficultyjudging battered women without bias. I have explored this
problem in the context of battered women on trial for killing or
injuring (or hiring someone to kill or injure) an abusive spouse, but
many of these problems would exist regardless of the type of action,
whether custody dispute or tort action. In particular, I have
identified problems posed by cognitive biases (categorization
accompanied by inaccurate stereotyping, the fundamental
attribution error, our tendency to empathize more readily with those
with power, and those whose stories seem credible because
consistent with cultural scripts).
To illustrate the specific difficulties these biases can cause
battered women, I have described some of the problems we saw
while preparing clemency petitions for women in Illinois in the
1990s as well as the problems faced by Sylvia Flynn in a murder
trial publicized by Court TV. Battered women are routinely
perceived as wholly passive and dependent, consistent with the
testimony of two "experts" in Flynn's case and with our tendency to
stereotype and to see members of other categories as more different
504. See, e.g., Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self.Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in CurrentReform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991) (arguing that most cases
involve a face-to-face encounter and therefore there is no broad need to change the meaning

of immanence as earlier authors had argued).
505. See supra notes 27-76 and accompanying text.
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from our selves than they actually are. In actuality, battered
women are a diverse group: some are economically independent
others economically dependent, most are angry, most fight back
verbally, many fight back physically, and many are jealous of
batterers who use their infidelity to inflict (psychological) injury on
their partners. Indeed, battered women tend to experience the
emotions most of us would experience were we demeaned, degraded,
and physically violated.
I have suggested three kinds of changes designed to improve
the fairness of trials of battered women who have killed or injured
abusive partners. First, I have suggested that more resources be
devoted to public defenders, including adequate resources for
investigations as well as reasonable case-loads. Second, I have
suggested that a number of restrictions be placed on evidence
admissible in such trials and on prosecutors' arguments, including
a pre-trial hearing on whether substantial abuse occurred.
Finally, I have argued for two kinds of changes related to
"experts" who'study the effects of domestic violence or the
experiences of battered women. First, that a person has some
training in psychiatry or psychology is not enough to qualify as an
expert on domestic violence. Second, prosecutors should not be able
to use the word "feminist" to undermine the credibility of an expert
(or anyone else in the prosecution of a battered woman).
Prosecutors now can introduce their own expert when a defendant
introduces an expert on battered women. The need for criteria is
therefore of critical importance at this time.

